POLLUTION OF SOCIAL OPPOSITION: "CHAPULLING" COINED BY TURKISH MEDIA AS A SCAPEGOAT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ISTANBUL GEZI OCCUPY

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Gezi Park Occupy, which started in the midsummer of 2013 in Turkey, witnessed both spontaneous organization of the opposition and description of the opposing individuals as "chapulling" by polluting opposition field in media discourse and presentation of them within the motive of "scapegoat". The heterogeneous groups protesting the destruction of İstanbul Gezi Park as a democratic right were criticised harshly by the ruling party and pro-ruling party media and these critics mostly caused the opponents to be interpreted as the source of all evils. Most notably, peaceful, environmentalist and anti-violence resistance rituals of opponents (environmental awareness, collective cultural activities, public concerts, free meal distribution, alternative religious celebrations, carnivalesque celebrations, social solidarity examples, etc.) were discursively distorted by the big media organs who are the voices of the predominant formal political culture in Turkey and were confined to a narrow, ideological area. One of the concepts highlighted by the relevant neologist media discourse is "Chapulling". This concept was a stance towards discrediting the activists having democratic and public demands and this discourse made chapulling concept a part of the effort to make protesters "scapegoat". This pejorative use was the equivalence of the scapegoat motive, which lost its subjectivity ontologically, and reduced to nihility was literally the symbol of the king, which was turned inside out by the remarks of Terry Eagleton. In this sense, so to say, those whose authoritarian personalities were opposed and hierarchical positions were overturned were the prominent political figures of Turkish political arena. In this study, the opposing individuals and groups, which are considered by the government as threat, are being discussed within the scope of scapegoat concept and the subject is being examined through the "chapulling" example coined by the dominant media discourse.

Keywords: Gezi park occupy, Scapegoat, Social opposition, Turkish media, Chapulling.

Introduction

The problem of source of evil has been an issue discussed in every age of the history. Being afraid of the wrath of unknown powers, man created sources and figures of evil and transferred the source of social sin to these centres, figures or persons. Named "scapegoat" or "whipping boy", sources of evil mostly turned into different beliefs or religious fictions. The concept of scapegoat which creates a spiral out of evil and catharsis, also stands on the boundaries of metaphysics and politics. The strategy of turning into scapegoat has almost always developed in parallel with the acts of laying the blame on someone else or creating excuses. For the same reasons, the social opposition acts experienced during Gezi Park occupy

have also been sacrificed by the political subconscious in Turkey instead of being evaluated under normal conditions within the framework of an enlightened public opinion or democratic rights of independent individuals. This traumatic mood, existing in the political subconscious in Turkey and generally giving voice to the state's fear of division, is brought to light by the state in the form of turning into scapegoats. We can say that the discussions of social opposition and political public sphere which started by Gezi occupy in Turkey have created a serious agenda regarding both democratisation and the nature of politics in Turkey. Before judging this subject at a single stroke, the subject of how the institutional politics shaped the scapegoat notion in the collective memory, which is one of the marginalisation practices, to bring a legitimate framework for those created by institutional politics has been discussed in this study which is based on the internal operation of the political public sphere. As is known, "the other" desperately needed by those in power while defining - and even strengthening- their own ontological situation throughout the history, has almost always been coded with the strategy of turning into a scapegoat. In the first section of this study where the concept of scapegoat is discussed in historical, theological and political contexts, the concept "Chapulling" has been used as a light motive. Again in the same section, it has been emphasized that although Gezi protests have presented the appearance of a radical and participatory democracy in Turkey in the sense used by Habermas, the viewpoint of the political power on these incidents is generally shaped through a discourse of hate. The fact that the policies of the power for suppressing the focal points of the social oppositions ended in turning the activists into scapegoats presents significant clues for the authoritative character of actual politics in Turkey. Therefore, the significance of "Çapulcu (chapuller)", which has appeared in the suppressive political atmosphere of Turkey today and can be said to have taken the stage reluctantly as the new political subject of the "structural transformation of public sphere" with a relatively organized manner, should not be ignored in terms of the problematic historical background of social opposition of the country. Consequently, the first statement to be mentioned should be the scapegoat motive of the "Çapulcu" figure and establishing a direct relation between the political power and the strategy of turning into scapegoats.

Scapegoat and Strategies of Turning into Scapegoats

The archetype of the action "turning into scapegoats" which started with the creation of man can be asserted to be the examples of Adam making Eve the scapegoat, and Eve making the snake i.e. Devil the scapegoat. In this theological narrative, man avoiding undertaking the responsibility of his own acts always looks for someone to blame, for a scapegoat. In addition to the easiness of showing a target, the problem of evil is also involved in the issue. The term "Scapegoat" was used by William Tyndale for the first time in 1530 in a translation of the Bible. In his translation, Tyndale used the Hebraic word "*Azazel*" as scapegoat (Campbell 2013: 29). Scapegoat, taking the blame of others although he is innocent, also turns into the source of social catharsis. The fact that the contestant Jade Goody used the word "escape goat" instead of "scapegoat" in the television program Big Brother can be shown as a good example of picking a victim for social catharsis and avoiding responsibilities. There is a similar mentality behind the fact that during Istanbul Gezi Park occupy, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which was in power declared the activists as a bunch of "Çapulcu" (marauders, looters) who hassle the state and the nation and create an uproar. According to Girard, the torture had a collective resonance (tone) when the Jews were lynched in Black Plague period (Girard, 1986:12). A similar resonance (tone) of making others scapegoats was experienced during Gezi occupy and therefore in a sense the subconscious of the state came to light. So to speak, activists fictionalized to be the source of public evil awoke the id of the state.

Attempts of sacrificing, making scapegoats or lynching of the social catharsis are only a few of the quick treatment methods of the society's psychology. Therefore, while the society feels relieved, the bad get punished and justice is served. In time, the concept of scapegoat has turned into a term that defines the persons or groups made the target of anger and blame after a disaster or devastation (Campbell, 2013: 40). Scapegoat rituals took place in plague or epidemic illnesses and deaths during the Middle Age and

sacrificial rituals for the salvation of the society were arranged. In this context, the majority consisting the *demos* (public) did not have any difficulty to find minorities and sinners to lay the blame of the community. The most obvious scapegoats of the history have been Jews and Gypsies. These groups, difficult to be understood by the majority, are cut out for being declared as the scapegoat. Because of their ambivalence life rituals, scapegoats are not only marginalised but also sacrificed to eliminate their characteristic of being a threat factor. These people, discussed in the work *Homo Sacer* written by Agamben, are scapegoats that became the targets of those holding political power. Regarding the semantic difference between the words zoe and bios which imply the life in Greek culture in the Ancient Period; zoe defines an ambiguous life experience whereas bios refers to a restricted and qualified life experience. Accordingly, the polis (city) refers to bios whereas zoe means life forms out of the polis which threaten the city. In this context, the power adds the persons and groups, who threaten the polis and are mostly determined by the government, in the area of zoe and declare them as scapegoats. One of the main purposes in this action is to push the lives, who threaten the power or the settled life, out of the system. With the modern period, the accomplishment gained by the power using the most complicated political techniques is the animalisation of man (Agamben, 1998:3). During animalization process of man, bios or in other words qualified life is thrown to zoe, i.e. wild and unqualified life. According to Agamben, Nazism is only one of the most disturbing examples of such biopolitics practices (1998:4). Similarly, in the Ancient Greek culture, general moral principles and social laws, i.e. nomos are one of the most important devices that determine bios and zoe. In this context, what was effective in determination of forms of normality and abnormality, discussed in Foucault's works related to the power and biopolitics in the modern period, was the nomos of the modern period. The intelligence that specified nomos in the modern period and Eurocentrism created scapegoats and "others" for themselves. The scapegoats created by Nazism in this sense were Jews, Gypsies and the disabled. One of the most efficient tools of the power with the aim of vindicating and legitimating themselves is making others scapegoats and doing this in a continuous manner. The fact that the dominant use their power on the scapegoats, who have a cursed body and are the source of evil, in all ages is one of the most typical examples.

Corruptive factor of social order materialises in the concept of "the other". The other are cursed people who threaten the order, laws and God and blur the lines drawn by these powers. What Kristeva defines as abject confronts the human with his fragile moments when he strolls around the lands of animalism. For instance, while primitive societies created their cultures, they left out animals and threatening abject area of animals which they envisaged as representatives of murdering and sexuality. Accordingly, the culture consists of the things left out the borders of what is abject (Kristeva, 1982:12-13). Again in this context, scapegoat transforms into the metaphor of curse and obscenity that is left out of the cultural area and threatens the order and law by forcing the limits of culture. A similar situation is seen in the fact that those who participated in Gezi protests were referred to the "Chapulling" (marauding, looting). After it was broadcasted on the media that activists were drinking the alcohol in a mosque, following interpretations were made; activists had no respect for sacred spaces and what is sacred. Therefore, people in Gezi protests were turned into abject beings who violate culture and sacredness. Violating the sacred and cultural borders also threatened the power of the dominant. After the power referred to the activists as "Chapulling", these groups were made scapegoats. Obscenity turns into an important tool for the "us" and "others" fiction of the power. The subject "I" in the centre of the meaning separates others from itself, refuses them and makes them abject. In this sense, repulsion is transformed into a narcissistic act which includes subjective diachrony. Repulsion exists with narcissism and makes narcissism fragile (Kristeva, 1982:13). This poignant state of the power, i.e. "I" denies the other and makes the narcissistic side more visible. The implicit narcissistic side of the power comes into prominence with the concept of "Chapulling". Chapulling, forming the profane and inferior side of the sacred state phenomenon in this process, also refers to negative self- presentation. Therefore, the strategy of turning into scapegoats is actualised by creating images to be hated and disgusted by the public who watch the power admiringly.

Scapegoats turn into an ontological being taking the lowest place in the hierarchical order with those in power. Eagleton specifies that the scapegoat is seen as a anonymous being deprived of subjectivity, and

reduced to rubbish and nothingness. According to him, this lonely and abandoned figure is the negative indicator of social integrity. Since he will symbolically undertake the sins of the society, the scapegoat is selected among the people taking place in the lowest category of the social hierarchy. According to Eagleton; borders between power and weakness, sacred and secular, central and surroundings, diseases and health, poison and treatment blur in the figure of scapegoat (2012: 360). This figure, blurring the borders and causing confusion, creates an ambivalence effect in ontological sense as well. It is possible to say that this ambivalence effect arises from the aporia between the concepts of the sacrificial and the sacred. Since the sacrificial is sacred, it is a crime to kill it, however the sacrificial is sacred because it is killed (Girard, 1977: 1). One of the situations where this ontological confusion becomes clearer is stated by Eagleton as follows: "The scapegoat is an inverted king figure" (2012:360). The political theology, placing the king to the top level in ontological range, reduces the scapegoat to the lowest level in return. Which means that: while divine power's reflection on Earth materializes in the king image, the scapegoat transforms into devil's reflection on Earth. In this context, the scapegoat is not only an image that mistakes and sins are attributed to, but also is the earthly extension of Devil who is the absolute source of evil. The profane emphasis of AKP, which is a centre-right party in Turkish politics, attributed to activists in its "Chapulling" rhetoric has similar tones. Being sacred, the power, finds its alter-ego, or in other words, its negative existence in the scapegoat. Therefore, the power who becomes sacred creates its own sacrificial. Sacrificing is innate to what is tragic, and the sacrificial is the incarnational form of the miserable who are ill with fear (Eagleton, 2005:129). While the sacred replaces with the secular in sacrificing, rules of cultural area also become blurry. The act of making others scapegoat starting with sacrificing of people has turned into more sophisticated marginalisation practices and biopolitics in time. When it comes to violence which is the symmetrical concept of the scapegoat; it mostly has a catharsistic influence. The catharsis ritual, which happens with the terrifying death of the hero in tragedies, not only ensures that demos (the public) feel relieved, but also protects the sovereignty from threats by enabling that the power directs the anger to others. Therefore, seeing someone else's pain causes that individuals and societies are thankful for what they have. In Ancient period, directing of *demos* by tragedy turns into quite efficient ideological tools in both protecting the polis and securing *nomos* (law, rules, traditions, etc.) which are effective for the polis. It is possible to say that tragedy is a very efficient tool in restoring the public. Therefore, the pathetical aspect of tragedies creates an emotional ground for the *demos* to create common experiences, institutions and traditions while awakes a similar pathos (emotional association) in public. A rich range of connotations of the goat involves the scapegoat, the stubborn goat or the goat of Satanists. Eagleton shows the goat image as an example from the ingenious description of fourteenth century commentator , Francesco da Buti. According to Da Buti, since the goat looks royal from front with its ostentatious horns and goatee, it is a tragedy symbol while it connotes comedies when seen from back because of its naked and coarse appearance (Eagleton, 2012: 35). This interweaving dichotomic meaning of tragedies and comedies comes together in a perfect way in the goat symbol. Again etymologically the concept of tragedy comes from the Greek word *tragos* which implies goat. In this context; *tragos*, tragedy, and scapegoat are melted altogether in the historical process and amalgamate with the same alchemy. Therefore, the subject in the practices of making others scapegoats is also similar to tragic heroes. Essences of tragedies, being sacrificed and being regarded as the scapegoat all have a similar chemistry. In this context, the theology of sacrificing and the anti-theology of being declared as a scapegoat have irrational meanings. Although the direct democracy or radical democracy acts experienced in Gezi Park protests seem like they have a rational meaning, the irrational meaning universe in Turkey has been concluded with the act of making activists scapegoat by referring to them with the concept "Chapulling". Thus, it is possible to say that rational political acts have been transferred to an irrational field within the political theological discourse in Turkey. Social opposition and participation which are among the essential conditions of modern democracies have mostly been unsuccessful in finding their counterparts in this irrational politic culture of Turkish political life.

Turkish political life where marginalisation strategies are continuously regenerated, emphasizes the border conditions in defining *physis* and *nomos* by the dominant. While physis mentions mechanical rules of nature, nomos expresses local rules of public. The exceptional case specified by Agamben exactly

brings this phenomenon to light. According to Agamben, the law is fed by exceptions and the law without exceptions is useless. In this context, law not only exists by itself, but also with human life. Inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, nomos and physis, all of which are determined by the dominant, are only a few of the concepts that constitute this uncertainty threshold. This uncertainty threshold determined by the power alludes to a strategic situation that is occasionally renewed rather than being permanent (Agamben, 1998: 27). In this context, when we discriminate between dominant nature and law, we also indicate definitions of normal and abnormal according to our own world view. The power determines what is normal in this discrimination materialised in contrast of acceptable citizens with "Chapulling" in Gezi Occupy. Acceptable citizen taken as normal by the power is categorised within the law whereas all protesters accepted as abnormal who run riot are included in the nature category. Again within this discrimination, "Chapulling" accepted to be abnormal and involving troublemakers is taken to the eerie field of naked life which includes a range of pejorative connotations such as death, violence, animalistic, anarchy, etc. However, is it really so? Who is a "Çapulcu" that official political rhetoric did not consider it harmful to add to the list of the cursed? What is the meaning of the word in the political literature in Turkey, what kind of semantic changes did it go through? Moreover, what does it mean in terms of social opposition? What does Çapulcu -who is a direct product of the political power, whose statements about those who do not support them get increasingly more authoritative, and current political conditions,- think about the political practices of Turkey in the year 2013 and what kind of rights does he demand,? Now let us try to find answers to this question and similar questions.

Political Scapegoat: "Çapulcu"

Being the other, is an opportunity for the ways of living, thinking, and imagining differently; existence of another opinion, another way of perception is a democratic opportunity in social systems built on majoritarian values. Promises given by being the other within the cultural and political possibilities correspond to a kind of experience diversity and richness in abundance of the relational connections; in the majority of perspectives. This is such an opportunity that it embodies the experience of losing the dominant voice of institutional master in authoritative social systems. Nevertheless, developments are not always concluded with an opportunity where difference, otherness and heterogeneity are collectively experienced and approved. Moreover, difference and otherness are sometimes perceived as serious barrier in front of social interlocking, as a kind of discord, and give life to a cliché judgment used for ensuring clarity for complicated incidents. As said by Campbell, especially in times when "complicated incidents force the mass to find simple explanations" (2013: 27). Therefore, communicational and intellectual opportunities presented by the other, by the different, are wasted simply by degrading them to the degree of "scapegoats" by wide range perspectives. This case was exactly for Gezi Protests during which the power fall into abeyance and which resulted in establishment of new political public resistance groups against brutal capitalist isolation by consociational and pacifist reactions through reciprocal cooperation, solidarity, and interaction of social segments, who are not similar to each other either in cultural or ideological terms, between May and June 2013 (Ege, 2013: 23). In other words, the singular truth of protesters and the devastating popular perception created on their "pluralist" identities (as reduced to one negative word) was exactly this word: "Çapulcu", which means bandit, which means gang, which means looters who are scapegoats, which is solely responsible for all disasters experienced in the society... Coding this word in a negative semantic platform under actual political conditions was an excuse made up for legitimating the violence resorted by the state. But who was "çapulcu (chapuller)" in reality and what kind of a semantic shift did he go through?
   When we consider the etymological origin of the words "Çapulcu" or "çapul", we see that they derive from the verb "çapmak" which means "to run" in old Turkish. The word "çapulcu", derived from a verb, means "messenger" or "dispatch rider". The word "çapkın", which also derives from the same verb, means "someone who runs after women", "someone looking for a partner" etc. (Kılıç, 2014: 72). Later on, the verb "çapmak" gained the meanings of "marauding", "looting" shift of meaning in the 17th

century. As Kılıç mentions, about two centuries later, in 19th century, we see that Ahmet Vefik Paşa used the word çapulcu with a different meaning. When defining the word "çete" (gang) in his work *Lehçe-i Osmani*, Paşa preferred using the "a bunch of çapulcu" (Kılıç, 2014: 73). In 20th century, "çapul" stands for "raid" and "çapulcu" stands for "raider". This last use of the word çapulcu has a rather positive meaning. Because the word raider is used for warriors who raid enemy states. However, it is quite meaningful that the word çapulcu lapses into a pejorative meaning and regains the meaning of 17th century through the institutional political power in the 21st century in Turkey.

With the meaning that Republic of Turkey Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdoğan intended to connote, the word çapulcu has come to mean a scapegoat that all wrong policies and blame of the power have been laid on, as a figure that terrorises, marauds, spoliates and spreads terror. In reality, çapulcu was born among a range of protesting acts (sitting, reading books, camping, keeping environment-friendly guards to stop trees from being uprooted) started by a bunch of peaceful environmentalists in Gezi Park. In a short time, the term çapulcu has turned into an effective political figure through appropriating the opposing connotations of this term which include other heterogeneous factors. The main subject of a strong objection appearing against the prohibitive, discriminative, suppressive, violent and law-violating policies of Erdoğan government was the main symbol of the threat arisen against the settled order. To the contrary to what was claimed, it was not marauding or looting, it was not sublimating violence or physical attack, and it was not a law-rule violating, randy or perverse figure. Just like "scapegoats was used as a way to get rid off the sins of the dead during the middle age" (Campbell, 2013: 40), "çapulcu" which represents the political conscience of Turkey in 2013 was also an ideal target for enabling to perceive the state violence, was come to light in time and resorted with impunity due to plan of the suppressive conservative despotic leader Erdoğan on assimilating and defusing those who do not agree with him. This was such a good target that it included all eliminative coordinates of authoritative political tendency: most of the people stigmatised with the term "çapulcu" were secularism supporters, socialists, nationalists, social democrats, liberals, communists, atheists, in short all classes that did not vote for AKP. In other words, the term "çapulcu" as Prime Minister Erdoğan got it referred to 57% of the population who did not vote for AKP and its policies that banalises violence and gives rise to poverty, corruption, prohibitions, injustice and inequity. AKP government, reducing democracy to non-existence of military coups and reducing freedom at universities to freedom of wearing turban, sowed seeds of anger among the conscious and sensitive classes of the society with various prohibitive acts in the private and sexual lives of people, deciding when and how much alcohol they can consume, what their national drink is, how many babies they should have, discussing an abortion ban and censuring even the books not published yet, by receiving continuous support from rural classes of the society who have mostly quite low educational level. Moreover, sub-meanings of Gezi Protests were not confined to them. For instance, disturbing and imposing policies such as preventing the freedom of information of the public totally in Reyhanlı and damaging the freedom of press which was already castrated, demolishing the historical Emek cinema publicly with the excuse of restoration, ending the broadcast of TRT3 state radio, which used to broadcast classical and jazz music, in a quiet and retiring manner and therefore scything the music taste of the intelligentsia, refusing to advancing towards the alleged offenders of Uludere (Roboski) massacre and trying to hide the ethnical pain by bribing monetary damages, the attempt of actualizing raising a religious generation with the 4+4+4 educational model, etc. were the causes of the "çapulcu" figure to take over the scene… In this respect, the attribution "çapulcu" was the name for the big "No" confronted by the increasingly authoritative AKP government's political suggestions in the political public space. It was the political language of a civil social sensivity, pluralism against majority, respectability against generality, freedom against suppression without any violence. The fact that the powers of the evil represented by Erdoğan's government were disclosed in the "çapulcu" protests was cuased by the fact that unfair implementations of this despotic politic mentality looking for secret plans and scenarios and losing its transparency and persuasiveness provided with the legitimatization grounds they were desperately seeking for. Therefore, what Erdoğan was claiming and trying to convince everyone about this "çapulcu" group was not true: they were not looters, illegal powers or members of a gang. What the word "çapulcu" meant when uttered by the members of the government was more important than its real meaning. In

other words, the word "çapulcu" as connoted by Erdoğan referred to a sort of "whipping boy" or scapegoat motive with the "attempt of bringing an emotional and rational consistency to an open-to-comment material with motives of fear of difference, anxiety of change and anxiety reduction" of the institutional status quo supporter politics (Bilgin, 1994: 160). Çapulcu displayed an external group outlook with its attitude favouring change, transparency, democracy, equality and freedom. As specified by Bilgi, "it was the opposite of the stereotyped mentality including ethnocentrism" (1994:191). Therefore, it referred to the victims of all kinds of conspiracies coming to mind first, whether official or not, having been taken the flak of emotional and behavioural reactions of prejudiced persons. As a matter of fact, high disinformation examples including conspiracies such as the Kabataş incident which was afterwards found out to have never taken place thanks to the records of a city surveillance camera (rumours that activists attacked a turbaned woman and urinated on her during Gezi Park protests) or the made-up news such as protestors entering a mosque without taking their shoes off and drinking beer in the mosque were concrete examples of transformation from prejudice to conspiracy. On the other hand, the scapegoat made visible by the aforementioned conspiracies was an indicator of the growing dimensions of the political crisis that Erdoğan's government has been going through. The depth of the crisis has been the fact that the public was expressing certain social demands in a consistent and insistent manner without losing their own solidarity. This was almost the very first time in political history of Turkey. When it comes to the essential emotional agreement made between "çapulcu" activists; this was nothing but the manifestation of the abasement and disappointment that people were collectively exposed to. Consequently, the term "chapulling" developed by the protesters as the product of a highly creative intelligence during Gezi Protests and the fact that all of its possible negative or positive meanings such as marauders, looters, raiders, ramblers, troublemakers, seducers, messengers, runners, etc. were appropriated was another way of sublimating it against the power as a result of the same offense of dignity. In reality, the meaning that the word "çapulcu" had for Gezi Protesters corresponded to an empathy/sympathy, respect, solidarity, mutual understanding and cooperation, lack of which has been felt in the country. Although the term "çapulcu" symbolises the opponents prone to be made scapegoats in the eyes of the "Big Brother" Erdoğan, in fact what really defines them correctly was the fact that "they were able to give place to those who were not similar to them in the park they went to in order to defend the city that was being reconstructed without their approval or their identities which they considered under threat and they were prone to climb over cultural thresholds instead of building new thresholds" (Gürbilek, 2104: 31). Moreover, those who bestowed the honour to call "çapulcu" themselves had important discourses to say about the human destruction caused by the global capitalist growth moving ahead in Turkey mercilessly: For instance, during Gezi Protests, Turkey bore witness to "Revolution Market", "Gezi Library", "Çapul TV", relief action for garbage collectors, volunteers erasing the sexist slogans written on walls, doctors and medical personnel providing medical services free of charge, lawyers defending people free of charge, free food halls on streets, gift economy, shoulder to shoulder solidarity of atheists and Muslims and many more friendly acts and democratic attitudes. In short, Gezi Park Protests were radiating hope as the antidote of an atmosphere called "lack of respect" by Richard Sennett (Altınay, 2014:161).

We should also remember that the only period when the spokesmen of serious political social demands were stigmatised with adjectives such as "çapulcu" was not Turkey of the year 2013. Çapulcu was a scapegoat motif that institutional political culture in Turkey kept on saying in as early as 1950s… For instance, during September 6-7 (1955) incidents when the country was again ruled by another conservative government (Democrat Party), "the chief prosecutor expressed "wild crimes" in his speech and specified that privacy of citizens was violated, and referred to the lycnhers as a group of 'çapulcu'". (Bora, 2014: 20). That is to say, even in 1955s, there was this strangeness in Turkey where the adjunct "çapulcu" was used as synonymous of scapegoat referring to people who responsibilities of all problems in the country will be pinned upon. The fact that "çapulcu" who was stigmatised as a kind of whipping boy or scapegoat was made the target of common hate by a political regime that defends oppressive and majoritarian values was confronted in Turkey of the year 2013. However, although the word "çapulcu" was used by the political power with the meaning of ramblers and looters, it brought new meanings to the

political literature as the manifestation of the reaction it caused among protesters. Soon after, this word was adapted to English language and the expression "Chapulling" was created (Kılıç, 2013: 46). Moreover, the fame of this concept spread in such a short time that even the Bosporus Jazz Choir composed songs with names such as "Are the çapullers ready?". Therefore, Prime Minister Erdoğan's expression of describing the protesters which involved scorning and sedition had a serious semantic shift and was embraced by large opposing groups. The attempt of making scapegoats was not successful. Moreover, as the term "çapulcu" increasingly turned into a symbol that aroused sympathy among demonstrators, thousands of active social media users added the words "T.C. (Republic of Turkey) Chapuller before their names. Contributions made by the "çapulcu" to political act repertoire demonstrated that they were not ramblers or looters: This was a kind of intelligence full of humour that turned the word Istanbul into "Isyanbul" (Rebelling Istanbul), Tunalı Hilmi Avenue into "Toma'lı Hilmi Avenue" (Toma: anti-riot water cannon vehicle) and transformed the reaction, against non-proportional police violence, into the "standing man" inaction.

If Gezi Park protests are the resulting rebellion of this abasement and offense of dignity as some indicated, "çapulcu", the leading actor of these protests, is the very man whose opinions, identity and lifestyle were humiliated by the power, and whose dignity was hurt. It can be even asserted that since the Tanzimat Reform Era, çapulcu was the steady target of the power, who was declared as the source of all evil and disasters, who opposed the power, called them to account, organized people and therefore was the least beloved person of the official political history, in social and political history of Turkey. From another perspective, he was a threat, a paranoia figure generated by the Turkish population among themselves... According to İnsel, this "reflects the status of not being able to create a community in the real sense and its roots exacerbate an identity crisis stigmatised with a perception of loss, a damnification leading to a split and divided empire" (2014: 48).

Conclusion

This mass rising in the person of this "çapulcu" figure in Turkey of the year 2013 consisted of "educated young people and petit bourgeoisie against the already reactionary state" as said by Alain Badiou (2013: 49). From another perspective, it was the loud cry of an educated generation accused of being "apolitical" for years by distinguished politicians for their own assertion of "existence" to primarily the conservative country leaders and then the whole world. The "çapulcu" figure which Prime Minister Erdoğan insistently tried to make a scapegoat of was indeed nothing but the civil and politicised identity of the Turkish individual. As is known very well, every conscious citizen being a part of an enlightened public opinion, and refusing to surrender to and obey the dominant opinions could never escape being declared a "scapegoat" in almost every age of history by settled political power groups no matter what adjectives were used to define them (revolutionist, rebel, troublemakers, looters, opponents, libertarian, etc.). Again in every age of history, every political authoritative tendency standing against the single multitudes looked for people to make scapegoats easily as a requirement of collective social interlocking and they found these people around. The ideal scapegoat of Gezi Park Protests was the "çapulcu" who was the mother of all evil as declared by the official political statements. It was him who anticipated something was going wrong in the country, realized political promises were pipe dreams and were seriously disappointed, had his expectations go upside down, whose identity and lifestyle were defamed; and who was the result of a peaceful and collective civil reaction refusing violence and language of violence no matter what and demanding more freedom and democracy. "Çapulcu", the prominent political actor of the Taksim Gezi Protests, also draped himself in the guise of authoritative Islamism as the concrete form of collective disapproval created in the country by the authoritative political sphere by constricting chances of freedom in public spaces through their oppressive and free market inclinations. With the words of Stiegler, "çapulcu" was the very person who "highlights the main infirmity of the government which calls for what is moral but accelerating the destruction of all moral life" (2013: 28). It is the future ideal

political prototype of the potential of a public neglected and ignored by imprudent and incompetent politicians for centuries trying to achieve democracy and autonomy by themselves…

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