THE EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE HISTORICAL VICTIMIZATION ON RECONCILIATION AND RESENTMENT TOWARD GREAT POWERS

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In three studies we examined how the perceptions about the in-group's historical victimization influence current attitudes toward great powers which have a special role in the in-group's past and present, i.e. the European Union and the United States of America. In Study1 the perceived invisibility of collective trauma by outgroups, in Study2 the acknowledgment of injustice against Hungary, and in Study3 the acknowledgment of past betrayal of Hungary was experimentally manipulated (using low versus high, and control conditions). There were no significant differences between the experimental conditions. However, our findings show that different beliefs about the in-group's historical victimization lead to different attitudes toward the EU and US. More specifically, exclusive victim beliefs (focusing on the uniqueness and severity of the in-group's victimization) are associated with resentment towards the EU and US, inclusive victim beliefs (focusing on the similarities between the in-group's and other group's victimization) are associated with reconciliation with the EU and US. These associations remained significant even after controlling for relevant variables such as demographics and political orientation.

Keywords: Exclusive versus inclusive victim beliefs, Resentment, Readiness for reconciliation, Visibility, Acknowledgment of victimhood.

> *"Hungary conquered and in chains has done more for freedom and justice than any people for twenty years. But for this lesson to get through and convince those in the West who shut their eyes and ears, it was necessary, and it can be no comfort to us, for the people of Hungary to shed so much blood, which is already drying on our memories."* (Albert Camus)

Introduction

National identity stems - at least partly - from the historical past of the group (Halbwachs, 1980). The type of historical events considered to be significant in the collective memory, i.e. peace or war, victory or defeat, and the psychological characteristics of historical narratives provides an opportunity to draw conclusions about the construction of the national identity (László, 2013).

The special sequences of positively and negatively evaluated historical events form the so-called 'historical trajectory' of the Hungarian nation (László, 2008), whereby triumphant events belong to the medieval period, that was followed by long centuries of occupation; local victories, wars of freedom and

revolutions against different great powers (e.g. the Habsburg Empire in 1848, the Soviet Union in 1956) were always ended with defeats and repression (Fülöp, Csertő, Ilg, Szabó, Slugoski, & László, 2014). The most significant collective trauma was Trianon Peace Treaty ended World War I, whereby Hungary lost 72% of its territory and 64% of its population, 3.3 million Hungarians were left outside of the new borders of the country. Exploratory studies on the Hungarian historical trajectory revealed that victimization by out-groups as a repetitive historical experience of the Hungarian nation is a central element of the group's identity (László, 2013). Narrative psychological content analyses of historical textbooks, historical novels, and folk historical narratives show that besides depressive emotional dynamics, there is a lower level of attributed in-group agency and control, and more mental states are attributed to out-group members, especially in case of negative events, which can mean a greater tendency to reject in-group responsibility. As a conclusion of his studies, László (2013) suggests that the Hungarian identity is unstable and vulnerable and the historical traumas of the group have yet to be processed.

This identity state is well suited to the construct of self-perceived collective victimhood (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori & Gundar, 2009). It is a mindset shared by group members believing that the in-group was intentionally harmed by other groups, and these harms were undeserved, unjust, immoral and cannot be prevented. As a consequence, the group can be characterized by a sense of helplessness. However, this victim identity status has severe social identity-serving functions, as well. Thus, groups can be motivated to maintain it. It can provide an explanation for threatening events, it motivates patriotism, and it can give moral justification in case of in-group aggression. This identity construal influences not only the inner functioning of the in-group but intergroup relations, as well. Victimization might cause aggressive tendencies, or what is more, the cycles of violence (Staub, 1998), but it can lead to prosocial attitudes towards other victim groups (Vollhardt, 2015), or willingness to reconcile with former perpetrator groups (Staub, 2008). The main question is what factors are behind these different outcomes, and what is more important, what is to do to reduce the negative impacts of perceived victimhood on intergroup attitudes.

In recent years, investigation of the psychological characteristics of collective victimization has received increased attention. Several empirical studies have been conducted focusing on different aspects of the construct.

For instance, the needs-based model of reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008, Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) has shown that the restoration of the agency or the power of the victim group increase trust (Shnabel, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2014) and willingness to reconcile with the perpetrator group (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009).

Another aspect of collective victimhood studies focuses on the comparability of in-group's and out-groups' victim experiences. While the competitive victimhood (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008), i.e. the belief that the in-group suffered more than the other group, leads to decreased tendency to forgive the adversary, the common victim identity (Shnabel, Halabi & Noor, 2013), i.e. the perceived and acknowledged similarity of victim experiences, can cause prosocial attitudes towards the outgroup. In line with that, Vollhardt (2009, 2012) differentiates between two types of victim consciousness: exclusive and inclusive victim beliefs. Exclusive victim beliefs construe the in-group's victimization as unique and distinctive. In contrast, inclusive victim beliefs acknowledge the similarities between the sufferings of the in-group and out-groups. There is a growing body of evidence that exclusive victim beliefs predict destructive outcomes, while inclusive victim beliefs predict constructive intergroup outcomes. For instance, American Jewish participants to whom the Holocaust had been shown in an inclusive, universal way, showed greater willingness to help the victims of the Darfur genocide (Vollhardt, 2013). Also, Vollhardt and Bilali (2015) conducted a survey research in three African country – Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern DRC –, and found a relationship between inclusive construal of in-group's suffering and positive, prosocial intergroup attitudes. In contrast, exclusive victim consciousness was associated with distrust and greater social distance, i.e. negative intergroup attitudes. Similarly, Vollhardt, Nair, and Tropp (2016) showed that inclusive victim beliefs of different minority group members, i.e. historically oppressed groups in India and second-generation immigrant Vietnamese

Americans predicted less hostility and greater support toward other refugees and immigrants, which effect was moderated by personal and family experiences of victimization. Similarly, in the Hungarian context, it has been also found that historically based victim beliefs influence the reactions in current social and political issues. Exclusive victim beliefs predict resentment toward former adversaries, i.e. Slovaks and Romanians, and negative attitudes toward unrelated, third-party victim groups, i.e. Syrian refugees. In contrast, inclusive victim beliefs predict reconciliation with Romanians and Slovaks, and prosocial tendencies toward refugees (Mészáros & Szabó, 2018; Vollhardt, Twali, Szabó, Cohrs, McNeill, Hadjiandreou & Winiewski, submitted).

There is another important aspect of collective victimization leading to positive intergroup relations, namely the acknowledgment of the in-group's sufferings. At an individual level, it has been proven that social acknowledgment as a victim is a protective factor in the aftermath of trauma (Maercker, Povilonyte, Lianova & Pöhlmann, 2009). At a collective level, SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, and Halabi (2015) have found that perceived acknowledgment of collective victimization by third-parties, i.e. when the in-group wins the victim status showed greater tendency to reconcile with the outgroup and had less pessimistic views of the conflict. In contrast, the sense of lack of victimhood recognition has negative effects on intergroup attitudes (De Guissmé & Licata, 2017). Other studies focus on the effect of acknowledgment by the perpetrators. For instance, Jewish American people reported higher level of psychological well-being, more conciliatory attitudes and less resentment to the perpetrator groups when they were exposed to an acknowledgment of violence by the former perpetrators (Vollhardt, Mazur, Lemahieu, 2014). In a recent research by Hameiri and Nadler (2017) the perceived acknowledgment of past sufferings by the adversary group has led not only to reconciliation but to readiness to accept responsibility and to offer apologies. Szabó (under review) suggests that the invisibility of collective victimhood by third parties – a concept closely related to the lack of acknowledgment – is particularly important in the Central Eastern European context. The Hungarian collective victimhood can be characterized as a kind of "forgotten" or unrecognized victimhood (see also Woolford & Wolejszo, 2006).

Overview of Current Research

The aim of our present study is to investigate how the perceived visibility and acknowledgment of past victimization influences the current intergroup relations in the Hungarian context. Three experimental manipulation-based studies were conducted to examine the attitudes toward great powers, namely the European Union and the United States of America.

European Union is a special – complex and sensitive - group to Hungarians, because, on one hand, Hungary is a member of it from free will, however, on the other hand, Hungary shares its membership with outgroups, which were its adversaries in World War I, and thus are affected in the chosen trauma (see Volkan, 2001) of Hungary, the Trianon Peace Treaty. To put it briefly, Slovakia and Romania acquired the largest part of former territories of Hungary thanks to the Trianon Peace Treaty. France also played a negative role for Hungarians, in the peace agreement. All of these countries share the EU membership with Hungary today, but of course, there are many other EU members being not affected in the trauma of Hungary. In recent years the Hungarian government has confronted the European Union in many respects. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán in his speech in 2012 compared the pressure of the European Union to the former rule of the Soviet Union (Kester, 2012).

The other examined great power is the United States of America, which had a special role in the Hungarian revolution against the Soviet Union in 1956. In the Cold War Hungary was one of the satellite states of Soviet Union. US founded radio stations gave Hungarians false hope, that if they rose up, the United States/United Nations/NATO would send military assistance. In 1956, Hungary staged an armed revolt for independence, but the danger of nuclear war prevented any military help, so Hungarians were left alone and the revolution was crushed.

In Study 1 we examined whether high versus low visibility of chosen trauma by Western Europeans today has an impact on the attitudes toward the shared superordinate group of the European Union. We expected that high visibility would be associated with reduced exclusive victimhood, less resentment towards the European Union, and increased readiness for reconciliation, whereas low visibility would be associated with increased exclusive victimhood, more resentment towards the European Union and reduced readiness for reconciliation. We also measured inclusive victim beliefs. We did not expect any particular connection between low vs. high visibility and inclusive victim beliefs, however, based on previous results, we predicted a positive association between inclusive victim beliefs and readiness for reconciliation (Mészáros & Szabó, 2018; Vollhardt, Twali, Szabó, Cohrs, McNeill, Hadjiandreou & Winiewski, submitted).

In Study 2, we manipulated the acknowledgment of injustice of the Trianon Peace Treaty by Western Europeans. Generally, we expected that high levels of acknowledgment would lead to reduced exclusive victimhood, less resentment towards the European Union, and increased readiness for reconciliation (compared to low levels of acknowledgment). As in Study 1, inclusive victim beliefs were expected to be related to readiness for reconciliation.

In Study 3 we manipulated the information about acknowledgment of past betrayal by the US in 1956. We expected that our manipulation will have the same effect: high levels of acknowledgment would be associated with reduced exclusive victimhood, less resentment towards the United States, and increased readiness for reconciliation (compared to low levels of acknowledgment). Again, inclusive victim beliefs were expected to be related to readiness for reconciliation.

It is important to note that in Study1 and 2 the historical adversarial groups, which had an active role in traumatization of Hungary are not directly and not clearly - only partly - the same as those which express the low versus high visibility/acknowledgment of injustice today. In contrast, in Study 3, the supposed past betrayal and the present acknowledgment of it, is accomplished by the same outgroup, the United States.

Study 1: Reconciliation and resentment toward the European Union depending on the visibility of collective trauma

Method

Participants: The sample included ninety-nine Hungarians (62 females, 37 males; M_{age} = 30,98 years, SD = 10,7). 39,4% of the participants live in the capital of Hungary, 23,2% in county cities, 19,2% in cities, and 18,2% in villages. In case of educational level: 38,4% of the participants completed high school, 32,3% completed college (BA/BSc), and 29,3% completed university (MA/MSc). Participants indicate their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from extreme left (1) to extreme right (7), where M = 4.34 (SD = 1.3). We also asked the liberal-conservative self-placement on another 7-point scale ranging from extreme liberal (1) to extreme conservative (7), where M = 3,67 (SD = 1,53).

Participants received the set of questionnaires online. Questionnaire completion took about 5-7 minutes. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. They received no reward in return for completing the questionnaire.

Manipulation of victimhood visibility: Participants were randomly assigned to either high (n = 49) or low visibility of collective trauma (n = 50) conditions. Participants first read a short account of the findings of a recent fictive research regarding peace treaties ended WWI. The study was said to be conducted by Oxford University. The text indicated that either 73% or 27% of the Western Europeans do not know at all about the details of the Trianon Peace Treaty (based on the methodology of Hameiri and Nadler, 2017).

Measures

The text was followed by several measures, each rated on a 7-point scale ranging from completely disagree (1) to completely agree (7).

Manipulation check: Following the text, a manipulation check was used, whereby participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale that to what extent was the details of the Trianon Peace Treaty known to the Western European people.

Credibility: We also measured the credibility of the text with one item, i.e. "Please indicate the extent to which you perceive the text as reliable".

Readiness for reconciliation with the European Union: Based on Shnabel et al (2009) willingness to reconciliation with the EU was measured by three items (e.g. „I would like to make better the relationship between Hungary and the EU"). The scale showed excellent internal consistency ($\alpha=,92$).

Resentment towards the European Union: Based on Vollhardt, Mazur and Lemahieu (2014) resentment was measured by three items (e.g. „I feel a great deal of animosity toward EU", $\alpha=,89$).

Victim beliefs: Based on Vollhardt and Bilali (2015) and Vollhardt, Nair and Tropp (2016) both exclusive (e.g. "The way in which Hungarians have been harmed is unique", $r=,75$, $p<,001$) and inclusive victim beliefs (e.g. "There are other nations that have suffered as much as the Hungarian people", $r=,78$, $p<,001$) were measured by two-two items.

Results

Manipulation check and credibility of the text. There is no difference between high ($M=4,9$, $SD=1,36$) versus low visibility of collective trauma ($M=5,2$, $SD=1,28$) condition regarding the credibility of the text, $t(97)=1,21$, $p = ,228$. Also, manipulation check shows that the difference between high ($M=3$, $SD=1,37$) and low ($M=2,56$, $SD=1,28$) visibility condition is not significant, $t(96)=-1,64$, $p = ,103$, so the manipulation didn't work.

As the manipulation did not work, we combined the data from the two conditions ($N = 99$). To test the relationship between all the main variables, we run bivariate correlations. The means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations are presented in Table1. Results show that exclusive victim beliefs are positively correlated with resentment, and negatively correlated with reconciliation, and inclusive victim beliefs show a contrary pattern.

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations for Study1 (N=99)

Variables	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Exclusive victim beliefs	-	-,79*	-,43*	,58*
2. Inclusive victim beliefs		-	,49*	-,57*
3. Reconciliation			-	-,57*
4. Resentment				-
M	2,98	5,31	5,47	2,57
SD	1,73	1,67	1,56	1,63

Note *$p<,01$

Using hierarchical linear regression analyses we examined the effect of exclusive and inclusive victim beliefs on reconciliation and resentment after controlling for demographic and political variables (for results see Table 2). The results suggest that inclusive victim beliefs are strong positive predictors of reconciliation and strong negative predictors of resentment.

Table 2. Results of hierarchical linear regressions. Dependent variables:
Reconciliation and Resentment toward European Union

Variables	Reconciliation			Resentment		
	b	*SE*	*ß*	*b*	*SE*	*ß*
(Constant)	20,10	4,50		6,70	4,21	
Age	-,08	,04	-,17[+]	-,03	,04	-,06
Gender	,55	,88	,06	,50	,83	,05
Place of Residence	-,87	,40	-,21*	,42	,37	,10
Level of Education	-,84	,45	-,18[+]	-,39	,43	-,08
Liberal-Conservative	-,66	,35	-,21[+]	,86	,33	,27*
Left-Right Political Orientation	-,39	,41	-,11	,35	,39	,09
Exclusive victim beliefs	,11	,21	,08	,24	,20	,17
Inclusive victim beliefs	,59	,20	,42**	-,42	,19	-,29*
	R^2=,38, F(8,86)=6,52, p<,001			R^2=,49, F(8,85)=10,27, p<,001		

Note [+]p<,10 *p<,05 **p<,01

Discussion

The attitudes toward EU were measured depending on the perceived level of the visibility of Hungarians' chosen trauma. The credibility of the texts was similar, but the manipulation didn't work. We found no significant difference between low versus high visibility of collective trauma conditions.

It is worth to note that in manipulation check the mean value of the recalled visibility of collective trauma was below the midpoint of the scale in both conditions, which means that even in case of high visibility condition, participants indicated a relatively lower level of perceived visibility. These findings are in line with Szabó's argument (under review) that in the Central Eastern European context, group members can perceive the group's victimhood as invisible, unrecognized.

Although the manipulation did not work, the results showed that exclusive victim beliefs were related to resentment and inclusive victim beliefs were related to reconciliation. Even after controlling for relevant demographic, political variables, and exclusive victim beliefs, inclusive victim beliefs remained significant, positive predictors of readiness for reconciliation and resentment. It seems victim beliefs are reliable underlying factors to the understanding of intergroup attitudes, even in the case of the superordinate category of EU.

Based on these results we conducted a second study using the same design as in Study1, but we used a different manipulation, whereby not the visibility but the acknowledgment of the collective trauma was manipulated. The aspect of acknowledgment is widely investigated, different studies proved that acknowledgment of victimization had shown increased readiness to reconcile and less resentment (e.g. Hameiri & Nadler, 2017; Vollhardt et al, 2014). To eliminate the limitation of Study 1, a control condition was also included in Study 2.

Study 2: Reconciliation and resentment toward the European Union depending on the acknowledgment of collective trauma

Method

Participants: The sample included 166 Hungarians (112 females, 54 males; M_{age} = 30,66 years, *SD* = 10,79). 31,9% of the participants live in the capital of Hungary, 25,8% in county cities, 23,3% in cities, and 19% in villages. As for educational level, 41,8% of the participants completed high school, 31,5% completed college (BA/BSc), and 26,7% completed university (MA/MSc). Participants indicated their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from extreme left (1) to extreme right (7), where M = 4.40 (SD = 1.44). We also asked the liberal-conservative self-placement on another 7-point scale ranging from extreme liberal (1) to extreme conservative (7), where M = 3,85 (SD = 1,63).

Participants received the set of questionnaires online. Questionnaire completion took about 5-7 minutes. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. They received no reward in return for completing the questionnaire.

Procedure: The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with two minor changes. Participants read the same text about a recent research investigating the Western Europeans' judgments of the peace treaties ending the WW 1, but this time not the visibility but the acknowledgment of collective trauma of Hungarians was manipulated. The story indicated that either 73% or 27% of the Western Europeans believe that the Trianon Peace Treaty afflicting Hungary was unjustifiable and excessive. Also, we added a control condition in which participants read the same text as in the manipulated versions but it didn't contain any information about acknowledgment. Participants were randomly assigned to either high (*n* = 62) acknowledgment, low acknowledgment of collective trauma (*n* = 47), or control (*n* = 57) conditions.

Measures

The text was followed by the same items (again on a 7 point scale) as in Study1. Thus at first a manipulation check and a measure of credibility were included. After this, the attitudes toward the EU was measured using the variables of *Reconciliation (α=,88)* and *Resentment (α=,87). Inclusive (r=,67, p<,001)* and *Exclusive victim beliefs (r=,72, p<,001)* were also measured again.

Results

Manipulation check and credibility of the text: Participants indicated similar level of credibility of the texts in all conditions, $F(2,161)$ = 0,84, *p* = ,435, M_{high}=4,82 SD_{high}=1,33. M_{low}=4,61 SD_{low}=1,58 $M_{control}$=4,98 $SD_{control}$=1,47. Manipulation check showed significant differences between all conditions, $F(2,163)$ = 50,76, *p* < ,001, so the manipulation worked. Participants in high acknowledgment condition indicated higher level of Western European acknowledgment of the injustice of Trianon Treaty (M_{high}=5,34 SD_{high}=1,38) compared to low acknowledgment and control condition (*p* < ,001 in both cases). In low acknowledgment condition the perceived level of acknowledgment of injustice (M_{low}=4,02 SD_{low}=1,75) was higher than in control condition ($M_{control}$=2,6 $SD_{control}$=1,35, p < ,001).

Victimhood consciousness: No differences were found neither in case of exclusive ($F(2,161)$ = 0,36, *p* = ,700, M_{high}=3,07 SD_{high}=1,76, M_{low}=3,04 SD_{low}=1,77, $M_{control}$=2,81 $SD_{control}$=1,64), nor in case of inclusive victim beliefs ($F(2,159)$ = 0,27, *p* = ,763, M_{high}=5,19 SD_{high}=1,52, M_{low}=5,32 SD_{low}=1,46, $M_{control}$=5,38 $SD_{control}$=1,47).

Dependent measures: Examining the effect of the manipulation of the acknowledgment of collective trauma, we found no significant differences between high versus low acknowledgment versus control

conditions in any of the variables, thus neither in *Reconciliation* ($F(2,161) = 0,05$, $p = ,950$, $M_{high}=5,28$ $SD_{high}=1,33$, $M_{low}=5,33$ $SD_{low}=1,51$, $M_{control}=5,24$ $SD_{control}=1,61$), nor in *Resentment* ($F(2,157) = 0,38$, $p = ,683$, $M_{high}=2,99$ $SD_{high}=1,69$, $M_{low}=2,85$ $SD_{low}=1,62$, $M_{control}=2,71$ $SD_{control}=1,73$).

Both dependent variables were re-analyzed with a one-way ANCOVA controlled for the left-right and liberal-conservative political orientation, and also for the exclusive and inclusive victim beliefs, but the pattern of results hasn't changed.

As the manipulation did not affect the dependent measures, we combined the data from the three conditions ($N = 166$) and examined the relationship between all the variables of Study2 by running bivariate correlations. The means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations are presented in Table3. As it shows, victim beliefs show the same pattern as in Study 1.

Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations for Study1 (N=166)

Variables	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Exclusive victim beliefs	-	-,74*	-,25*	,52*
2. Inclusive victim beliefs		-	,37*	-,47*
3. Reconciliation			-	-,56*
4. Resentment				-
M	2,97	5,29	5,28	2,86
SD	1,72	1,47	1,47	1,68

*Note *p<,001*

Again, we tested the predictive power of exclusive and inclusive victim beliefs on reconciliation and resentment, controlling for demographic and political variables (see Table 4). Results show that inclusive victim beliefs predicted reconciliation, exclusive victim beliefs predicted resentment towards EU.

Table 4. Results of hierarchical linear regressions. Dependent variables:
Reconciliation and Resentment toward European Union

Variables	Reconciliation			Resentment		
	b	*SE*	*ß*	*b*	*SE*	*ß*
(Constant)	12,12	3,60		,24	3,24	
Age	,01	,03	,01	,03	,03	,07
Gender	,46	,70	,05	-,78	,63	-,07
Place of Residence	-,36	,32	-,09	,36	,29	,08
Level of Education	,33	,36	,07	,17	,32	,03
Liberal-Conservative	-,87	,27	-,32**	,99	,24	,33*
Left-Right Political Orientation	-,09	,29	-,03	,69	,26	,20*
Exclusive victim beliefs	,18	,14	,14	,35	,13	,25**
Inclusive victim beliefs	,49	,17	,32**	-,18	,15	-,11
	$R^2=,28$, F(8,142)=6,83, p<,001			$R^2=,53$, *F*(8,140)=19,42, p<,001		

*Note *p<,05 **p<,01*

Discussion

Results show that the manipulation of the acknowledgment of injustice of the Trianon Peace Treaty had a main effect, so the participants understood the content of the texts, the manipulation worked this time. The perceived credibility was similar across the three conditions. Still, no significant difference was found in any of the dependent measures. Thus, the main hypothesis of our study had to be rejected, in the present study the perceived level of acknowledgment had no effect on the attitudes toward the European Union. Findings of previous studies showing that acknowledgment of suffering can lead to positive intergroup relations, for instance, increased level of conciliatory attitudes and less resentment (e.g. Hameiri & Nadler, 2017; SimanTov-Nachlieli et al, 2015; Vollhardt et al, 2014) haven't been replicated in Hungarian context. It might be that these kind of attitudes are too stable to be changed by such kind of information, or by such a short-time manipulation.

However, it is worth to note that the mean values of the manipulation check were higher in this study, thus in high acknowledgment condition the mean value of perceived acknowledgment was well above the midpoint of the scale, low acknowledgment was almost exactly on the midpoint, and control condition was well below it. It seems, manipulation used in this study was more effective, and information about a relatively small percentage of people acknowledging the ingroup's suffering means a real difference from control condition, which shows a basic, fundamentally lower level of estimated acknowledgment of ingroup's trauma. This supports the notion of unrecognized victimhood of Hungary.

Nevertheless, exclusive versus inclusive victim beliefs stemming from the different perception of historical victimization have been proven repeatedly to be a significant factor behind the intergroup attitudes, even after controlling for demographic and political variables. Our results show that not the acknowledgment of past trauma but the comparability of victimization is related to attitudes toward European Union.

However, EU is a special and complex superordinate category to Hungary (Hungary is a member of it, and there are many EU countries which are not affected in Hungarian history). When we ask participants to reflect the EU, it is not guaranteed that relation between the EU and former historical adversaries is clear enough to them. Thus, we wanted to test the effect of acknowledgment in case of another superpower (US), where there is a clear continuity between the former "betrayer" and the current group.

Study 3: Reconciliation and resentment toward the United States of America depending on the acknowledgment of betrayal

Method

Participants: 101 Hungarians participated in the study (61 females, 39 males; M_{age} = 35,09 years, SD = 14,41). 32,2% of the participants live in the capital of Hungary, 13,8% in county cities, 33,3% in cities, and 20,7% in villages. As for educational level, 48,3% of the participants completed high school, 29,9% completed college (BA/BSc), and 21,8% completed university (MA/MSc). Participants indicate their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from extreme left (1) to extreme right (7), where M = 4.59 (SD = 1.25). Liberal-conservative self-placement was also measured on a 7-point scale ranging from extreme liberal (1) to extreme conservative (7), where M = 4,13 (SD = 1,39).

Participants received the set of questionnaires online. Questionnaire completion took about 5-7 minutes. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. They received no reward in return for completing the questionnaire.

Procedure: The procedure was similar to Study 1 and Study 2. Participants first read a short account of the findings of a fictive recent research regarding what percent of American people believe today that the USA betrayed Hungary in 1956. The study is said to be conducted by Harvard University. The story

indicated that either 73% or 27% of Americans judge that the US did betray Hungary. Also, a control condition was added in which participants read the same text as in the manipulated versions but it didn't contain any information about the acknowledgment of betrayal. Participants were randomly assigned to either high ($n = 37$) acknowledgment, low acknowledgment ($n = 30$), or control ($n = 33$) conditions.

Measures

The text was followed by several items (see below), each rated on a 7-point scale ranging from completely disagree (1) to completely agree (7). At first, manipulation check and measure of credibility was included as in Study1 and Study2.

Readiness for reconciliation with the United States: Based on Shnabel et al (2009) reconciliation with the US was measured by three items (e.g. „ E.g. „I am optimistic regarding the future relations between Hungary and the US", $α=,63$).

Resentment toward the United States: Based on Vollhardt, Mazur and Lemahieu (2014) resentment was measured by three items (e.g. „I feel a great deal of animosity toward the US", $α=,70$).

Victimhood consciousness: Inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs were measured similarly to Study 1 and 2 using the same two-two items. The correlations of the items were strong both in exclusive victim beliefs ($r=,70, p<,001$) and in inclusive victim beliefs ($r=,60, p<,001$).

Results

Manipulation check and credibility of the text: Similar level of credibility of the texts was shown across all conditions, $F(2,97) = 0,68$, $p = ,511$, $M_{high}=4,54$ $SD_{high}=1,41$, $M_{low}=4,13$ $SD_{low}=1,38$ $M_{control}=4,33$ $SD_{control}=1,49$. Manipulation check showed significant differences between all conditions, $F(2,97) = 30,25$, $p < ,001$. Participants in high acknowledgment condition indicated higher level of American acknowledgment of the betrayal of Hungary ($M_{high}=4,68$ $SD_{high}=1,53$) compared to low acknowledgment and control condition ($p < ,01$ in both cases). Similarly to Study2, in low acknowledgment condition the perceived level of acknowledgment of betrayal ($M_{low}=3,43$ $SD_{low}=1,85$) was higher than in control condition ($M_{control}=1,91$ $SD_{control}=0,98$, $p < ,001$).

Victimhood consciousness: No difference was found in case of inclusive victim beliefs ($F(2,82) = 1,13$, $p = ,327$, $M_{high}=5,28$ $SD_{high}=1,37$, $M_{low}=5,82$ $SD_{low}=1,20$, $M_{control}=5,39$ $SD_{control}=1,69$). In case of exclusive victim beliefs a significant main effect was found ($F(2,83) = 4,59$, $p = ,013$). People in the high acknowledgment condition indicated higher level of exclusive victim consciousness ($M_{high}=3,71$ $SD_{high}=1,87$) as compared to low acknowledgment condition ($M_{low}=2,41$ $SD_{low}=1,28$, $p = ,011$). Control condition ($M_{control}=2,85$ $SD_{control}=1,81$) showed no difference either with low ($p = ,596$) or with high ($p = ,134$) acknowledgment condition.

Dependent measures: Examining the effect of the manipulation of the acknowledgment of betrayal, we found no significant differences between high acknowledgment, low acknowledgment and control conditions neither in *Reconciliation* ($F(2,85) = 0,57$, $p = ,57$, $M_{high}=4,17$ $SD_{high}=1,28$, $M_{low}=4,27$ $SD_{low}=1,28$, $M_{control}=4,51$ $SD_{control}=1,27$), nor in *Resentment* ($F(2,87) = 1,40$, $p = ,25$, $M_{high}=2,74$ $SD_{high}=1,44$, $M_{low}=2,25$ $SD_{low}=0,99$, $M_{control}=2,31$ $SD_{control}=1,26$).

Both dependent variables were re-analyzed with a one-way ANCOVA controlled for the left-right and liberal-conservative political self-placement, and also for the exclusive and inclusive victim beliefs, but the pattern of results remained identical.

Similarly to Study1 and Study2, we combined the data from the three conditions ($N = 101$), and examined the relationship between all the variables of Study3 by running bivariate correlations. The means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations are presented in Table5.

Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations for Study1 (N=101)

Variables	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Exclusive victim beliefs	-	-,73**	-,16	,43**
2. Inclusive victim beliefs		-	,20	-,35**
3. Reconciliation			-	-,40**
4. Resentment				-
M	3,03	5,48	4,31	2,44
SD	1,72	1,43	1,27	1,25

Note *p<,001

We also run linear regression analyses to test what factors predict reconciliation and resentment toward the US. Results show that reconciliation has no relation to victim beliefs, but in case of resentment exclusive victim beliefs are significant predictors of it (see Table 6).

Table 6. Results of hierarchical linear regressions. Dependent variables:
Reconciliation and Resentment toward United States

Variables	Reconciliation			Resentment		
	b	*SE*	*ß*	*b*	*SE*	*ß*
(Constant)	16,91	4,05		4,53	3,64	
Age	-,02	,03	-,06	-,02	,03	-,09
Gender	-,68	,84	-,09	-1,80	,75	-,23*
Place of Residence	,17	,37	,05	,12	,34	,04
Level of Education	-,02	,43	-,004	,38	,38	,10
Liberal-Conservative	-,46	,38	-,17	,90	,35	,32*
Left-Right Political Orientation	-,81	,45	-,26[+]	,01	,40	,003
Exclusive victim beliefs	,04	,18	,04	,38	,16	,33*
Inclusive victim beliefs	,25	,20	,18	-,10	,18	-,07
	R^2=,19, F(8,74)=2,14, p<,05			R^2=,36, F(8,75)=5,22, p<,001		

Note [+]p<,10 *p<,05

Discussion

In this study we tested the hypothesized effect of acknowledgment on intergroup attitudes in relation to the United States. Although, manipulation check showed a main effect – the manipulation worked –, and the perceived credibility was similar across the three conditions, no differences were found between the conditions in any of the dependent measures. Thus, the perceived level of acknowledgment of past betrayal had no effect on the attitudes toward the US.

There was only one significant difference across the conditions, exclusive victim beliefs were higher in high acknowledgment condition than in low acknowledgment condition. So if people receive the information that a relatively higher percentage of outgroup members acknowledge the past betrayal, they experience it as an encouragement, or a kind of legitimacy to feel unprecedentedly harmed in history. It might be expected that the confession of past betrayal of the outgroup causes satisfaction and

peacefulness, however, in this case it rather confirms the in-group that what happened to them is unique. This is not surprising if we consider the protracted historical victimization (László, 2013) and probably forgotten or unrecognized kind of victimhood (Szabó, under review), and as a consequence, the Hungarians' increased need to gain acknowledgment and support.

In addition to all of this, exclusive victim beliefs have been repeatedly proven to be important factors behind resentment toward the US.

General Discussion

Three studies were conducted to investigate whether the visibility or acknowledgment of past traumas influences the relationship with great powers today. Hungarian collective identity can be characterized by historical victimization. The historical trajectory of Hungary is full of oppression, detachment of territories and betrayal by other groups. It has led to a vulnerable victimized identity, which can be characterized by helplessness, perceived injustice and distrust (see Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). Great powers are special groups because there is always the potential either to be dominated or to be defended by them. However, Hungary has bad historical experiences with such kind of powers, thus the main question is: what is the message of past grievances, what is the best strategy: to trust and cooperate or to be careful and independent. It seemed reasonable to hypothesize that if historical sufferings are recognized, it would lead to increased conciliatory and peaceful attitudes toward outgroups, but we cannot draw this conclusion from our results.

The so-called chosen trauma (Volkan, 2001) of Hungarians is the Trianon Peace Treaty which ended the WW I, and it is perceived as an excessive retribution and a shocking injustice even today. This event is a central element of Hungarian identity. Almost a hundred years later it determines the attitudes of Hungarians to the world. In 2004 the country became a member of the European Union, and this event could have been interpreted as a kind of compensation for past sufferings (see Lasas, 2008). The specialty of this superordinate group is that within this category past adversaries of Hungary are its allies today, which lead Hungarians face a psychologically complicated situation. Results show that acknowledgment doesn't have a real impact on this sensitive relationship.

The case of the USA is interesting from another point of view. Revolution against the Soviet Union can be characterized by two main emotions: hope and disappointment, which are historical trajectory emotions of Hungarians (László & Fülöp, 2010; László, 2013). The feeling of being left alone pervades Hungarian identity, but it seems that perceived acknowledgment is not able to restore past disappointments, as if it would not make any difference.

Nevertheless, our studies have important implications for the understanding of attitudes toward great powers. It has been proven that the measured intergroup attitudes are related to exclusive versus inclusive victim beliefs. This is in line with our previous results where comparative victim beliefs have been found to be strong predictors of intergroup attitudes even after being controlled for many other demographic, political and social psychological variables (Mészáros & Szabó, 2018; Vollhardt, Twali, Szabó, Cohrs, McNeill, Hadjiandreou & Winiewski, submitted). Based on this, it can be said that the different types of victim consciousness stemming from historical representations influence how people are related to different outgroups, thus to the great powers, as well. While exclusive victim beliefs might lead people to be more suspicious and standoffish, inclusive victim beliefs show an increased willingness to be more forgiving and open.

So if we would like to draw conclusions and formulate what history has taught us, there is a difference depending on the construal of victimhood. People with exclusive consciousness believes that no one can be trusted, the in-group should resent and not forgive anybody, even today. In contrast, people with inclusive victim consciousness believe that it does not make sense to resent after so many years; the in-group should reconcile, because the future and prosperity of the country depend on whether it is able to be open.

Acknowledgements

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