



## **RUSSIAN EURASIANISM VERSUS AMERICAN EURASIANISM WITHIN THE PERSPECTIVES OF BRZEZINSKI AND DUGIN: A CASE STUDY ON THE RECENT UKRAINIAN CRISIS**

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Throughout world history, the Eurasia region has been regarded as a critically significant region in terms of geo-political considerations. The basis of this importance is the positioning of significant trade routes and crucial natural resources for both developed states and developing states. The Russian Federation and the United States of America cannot detach themselves from this reality. Thus, they have been developing multi-dimensional policies toward this region in order to be able to control it. For the Russian Federation, the Eurasianism developed by Alexander Dugin prioritizing the re-establishment of a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union by the Kremlin, has been the main foreign policy line. The declaration of the Near Abroad Doctrine in 1993, determining the fundamental principles and means of implementing this policy, is still operative today. On the other hand Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security advisor of Jimmy Carter underscores that Washington has to develop and implement an integrated, comprehensive and long term geo-strategic vision for the whole Eurasia. Since the independence of Ukraine in 1991, this country has been one of the principal geo-political playing fields for diplomats in Moscow and Washington. As long as Kyiv sustains its importance, this struggle is likely to maintain itself, at the very least, in the forthcoming years.

**Keywords:** Eurasianism, Russian Eurasianism, American Eurasianism, Near Abroad Doctrine, NATO Enlargement, EU Enlargement, Ukraine.


### **Introduction**

Throughout the world history, the Eurasian region has been regarded as one of the most vital regions. Given its geo-strategic, geo-economic, geo-political and geo-cultural features, it has been attracting the interests both in regional and global contexts. Firstly several empires and then countless states have developed multi-dimensional policies for being influential in this geography. From the end of WWII to the end of Cold War, most of the Eastern Eurasia was under the influence of Soviet Union. However in the aftermath of official dissolution of USSR in 1991, this geographical place has increased its noteworthiness owing to the emergence of new ethnic conflicts and the presence of abundant oil and natural gas resources in the former Soviet geography. In that manner, as the former ruler of this area, the newly established Russian Federation has been actively involving in the regional affairs principally after the declaration of Near Abroad Doctrine in 1993. Furthermore, the Eurasianist foreign policy indoctrinated by Aleksandr Dugin<sup>1</sup> has turned out to be

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<sup>1</sup> A sociology professor at Moscow State University, ex-advisor of Duma Presidency in the fields of strategy and geopolitics between 1998 and 2003, and also the founder of International Eurasia Movement in 2003.

the central foreign policy line in Vladimir Putin's period, starting with 2000. In the initial years of Putin, Russia has experienced very comprehensive changes and has strengthened itself especially with the increase of oil prices. In terms of foreign policy, Moscow has been prioritizing to become the dominant power in Eurasia and to restore its old hegemon power. Within that context, Moscow has strongly been rejecting the NATO and EU enlargements in this region given that Kremlin does see these two inter-related issues as the focal national security threat. For that reason chiefly on account of the geo-political, geo-strategical, geo-economic and geo-cultural reasons, it has constantly been emphasizing its strong opposition of Ukraine's rapprochement initiatives with the Euro-Atlantic Bloc.



Source: <http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/53c90ea5ecad04170b7ee562-840-579/db%20geo%20political%20hotspots.jpg>.

On the other hand, when we come to the United States' perspective toward the Eurasia in the post-Soviet period, Brzezinski states that Eurasia is the central arena of the World. The Eurasia Balkans, including the Southern region of the Russian Federation, is indeed a threat factor, having the potential to be a hot spot for ethnic clashes and Great Powers' rivalry. The security of a few weak states geographically located in proximity to main regional powers in the contemporary world is dependent on the international status-quo strengthened by the global superiority of Washington. In that sense, one of the most significant countries coming into the forefront of the perspective of American Eurasianism is Ukraine. Because providing security for a Wider Black Sea region and European energy security make Ukraine an indispensable country for the Atlantic Bloc.

Within the framework of abovementioned standpoints, the current Ukrainian Crisis in line with the perspectives of Russian Eurasianism and American Eurasianism will be examined in this paper. The main parameters of Russian Eurasianism will briefly be discussed in the first part of the paper. In this part of the paper, why the Ukraine is so momentous for Russian Eurasianism will be indicated as well. Then, the position of Ukraine within the American Eurasianism will be elaborated in the second part of the paper. Bearing in mind of these two chapters, the existing Ukraine Crisis will be deliberated in the third and final part of the paper.


## 1. The Fundamental Parameters of Russian Eurasianism

According to Dugin, one of the leading intellectuals of Russian Eurasianism, the geo-political analysis can specifically be separated into history, strategy and geography dimensions.<sup>2</sup> Also the discipline

<sup>2</sup> Aleksandr Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, trans. Vügar İmanov, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2010), Sixth Edition, pp. 341-344.

defining the reality of the world as the discrepancy between “*Land Civilization versus Sea Civilization*” should be named as “*Geopolitics*”. For Dugin, the historical struggle between Sea and Land has finally come to be the confrontation between Atlanticism and Eurasianism in our era. This is occurring at the level of “**Very Great Game**”. The geo-politics is the science on the clash of civilizations. In the first dimension, when citing Eurasianist and Atlanticist poles is a very good approach, certain states move in the name of those poles. To Dugin, the most influential representatives of these two poles are Washington and Moscow in today’s world.

The issue proposed by Chopard in the “Great Game” belongs to this dimension. In terms of “Very Great Game or The Civilizational Approach”, the vital issue for both the civilizational models’ global sovereignty is the control of coastal lands of Eurasia. The most important parts of this coastal region are Europe in the West, Middle East in the South, Islamic Republic of Iran, India, China and Japan in the Far East – in the wider meaning, the Pasific Basin-.<sup>3</sup> The Atlanticists – firstly London, now Washington - wish to separate the coastal region located at the main land from the axis of Eurasia pole in other words; the real Russian lands. On the other hand, the Eurasianists try to break this rigorous siege, to make the forces of coastal region as their strategic partners, in other words; try to include them inside the continental bloc. In that manner, the Eurasia will have reached to “Warm Seas” and have the ability to globally challenge to Atlanticism.<sup>4</sup> Thus, such kind of a continental unification predominantly makes the Eurasia as the privileged one and by this way the downfall of Atlanticist civilization will be indispensable. Therefore, the Very Great Game is composed of the joint formation of Berlin (The Capital of Europe), Moscow (The Capital of Eurasia) and Tokyo (The Capital of Pasific Basin) Axis with Russian-Iranian Axis.<sup>5</sup> According to the principal evaluations, such kind of continental alliance structuring is the most concrete and the perfect one. If this can be realized, this means the radical and irreversible win of Land over the Sea meaning the establishment of Eurasianist World Order. The alliance of Moscow with Berlin (in the wider context; Europe), Tokyo (the Pasific Basin) cannot be classified as the coincidence of historical moment. From Dugin’s perspective, it should be named as destiny.<sup>6</sup>



2-d map of multipolar world. Four zones - big spaces.  
1. North-American big space 2. Central American big space 3. South American big space 4. European big space  
5. Arabo-Islamic big space 6. Trans-Saharan big space 7. Russian-Eurasian big space  
8. Islamic continental big space 9. Hindu big space 10. Chinese big space 11. Japanese big space 12. New Pacific big space

Source: [http://2.bp.blogspot.com/\\_NWC3C1YUjw/VhVDE8qZERI/AAAAAAAAAbl/P4KbLGAikk8/s1600/map-Structure2.jpg](http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_NWC3C1YUjw/VhVDE8qZERI/AAAAAAAAAbl/P4KbLGAikk8/s1600/map-Structure2.jpg).

<sup>3</sup> Sina Kısacık, “Aleksandr Dugin’e göre 21. Yüzyılda Rusya’nın Avrasya Politikası Nasıl Olmalı?”, *Uluslararası Politika Akademisi*, 31 March 2013, available at: <http://politikaakademisi.org/2013/03/31/aleksandr-dugine-gore-21-yuzyilda-rusyanin-avrasya-politikasi-nasil-olmalı/>, accessed 29 February 2016.


<sup>4</sup> Ali Hasanov, *Jeopolitik: Teorileri, Metodolojisi, Aktörleri, Tarihi, Karakteristiği ve Kavramları*, trans. Azad Ağaoğlu and Fuad Şammedov, (İstanbul: Babiali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2012), p.170.

<sup>5</sup> Mesut Hakkı Caşın and Giray Saynur Derman, *Rus Dış Politikasındaki Değişim ve Kremlin Penceresinden Yeni Ufuklar*, (Ankara: SRT Yayınları, 2016), pp. 214-219.

<sup>6</sup> Cavanşir Feyziyev, *Türk Devletleri Birliği: Küresel Entegrasyonun Avrasya Modeli*, ed. Okan Yeşilot, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016), pp. 186-189.

The Eurasianist School together with its instruments, methods, history, classics and so on accepts the guidance of geopolitics' data and within that context; it views the fate of Eurasia identical with Kremlin's fate.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, everything is acceptable which provides the strengthening of civilizational dominance of Eurasia, the being powerful of Russia and its freedom, implementing its historical duty with victory. From Dugin's point of view, everything that helps this mission is good; everything that prevents this is bad. The Germany-Russian Federation-Japan-Iran Axis is the objective guarantee of Eurasia's victory which means an absolute necessity. Japanese, German and Iranian Eurasianists are well aware of geo-political logic and they wish to set up tight alliances with Kremlin via using every possible tool.<sup>8</sup> Dugin underlines that the great war of continents happen in very deep and serious levels that is inappropriate to the feelings and fears of humans.

Dugin stresses that the Caspian oil pipeline projects are critically important within geo-political manner. The strategic plans of White House represent the formation of a geo-political zone that unifies the Caspian with the Turkish shores of Black Sea in which this is one of the very critical geo-political aims of White House.<sup>9</sup> Given the limitedness of world oil reserves, Washington is successful on the continuation of world hegemony through controlling and transportation of oil to developed countries. Within this milieu, the strategic target of global struggle between Atlanticism and Eurasianism, in the current circumstances, is to control over the Caspian-Black Sea Region. Dugin thinks that the general characteristics of the geo-political situation in the whole Caucasia region forces Moscow to restrain its strategy. The foremost condition of this strategy is to move against Washington and its satellites' plans; in other words, all the projects and orientations which can be defined as "Atlanticism".<sup>10</sup> This condition has to be at the top priority. It has to be counteracted against Atlanticism by not just confronting face to face but also making artificial cooperation under the view of ensuring joint peace initiatives with it. Moving from this condition, Moscow has to strengthen its bases in the Caucasia. Especially, apart from the mechanically remaining from Soviet times, the pro-Kremlin tendencies based on the new power lines have to be kept in mind.<sup>11</sup>



Source: [http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/file.php?path=/images/CQ\\_Researcher/r20140207-russiainmap.gif](http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/file.php?path=/images/CQ_Researcher/r20140207-russiainmap.gif).

<sup>7</sup> Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, pp. 345-346.

<sup>8</sup> Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, "Bağımsız Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Dugin'in Yeni Avrasyacılık Önerileri", in *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya: "Rekabetten İşbirliğine"*, ed. Tayyar Arı, (Bursa: Marmara Kitap Merkezi, 2010), pp. 285-289.

<sup>9</sup> Dimitrios Triantaphyllou and Yannis Tsantoulis, "Russia in EU and US Foreign Policy: The Energy Security Dimension", in *Issues in EU and US Foreign Policy*, ed. Münevver Cebeci, (Lanham, Maryland, United States of America: Lexington Books – A Division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), pp. 276-278, Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus: An Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.177.

<sup>10</sup> Ömer Göksel İşyar, *Avrasya ve Avrasyacılık*, (Bursa: Dora Basım-Yayın-Dağıtım, 2010), pp. 196-230.

<sup>11</sup> Yalçınkaya, "Bağımsız Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Dugin'in Yeni Avrasyacılık Önerileri", pp. 277-280.



### 1.1. The Significance of Ukraine within the framework of Russian Eurasianism

As stated by Dugin, the sovereignty of Ukraine is a very negative fact given that it can in principle triggers the military confrontation. Russia lacking of Black Sea coast from Uzi Castle to Kerch Strait in which she acquires a very small land controlled by an ambiguous one in reality, this makes the situation of Russia as a normal and independent state into a suspicious one.<sup>12</sup> Dugin underlines that the Black Sea doesn't substitute the accession to Warm Seas and given the concrete control of Atlanticism over the İstanbul and Dardanelles Straits, the geo-political significance of Black Sea sharply decreases. Together with this, due to its being very suitable, prestigious and inexpensive border, it provides the opportunity to protect the central regions at least from the danger of possible expansion of Turkey's influence. Therefore, the emergence of a geo-political subject that can be a pro-Atlanticist is an absolute anomaly that will just completely cause irresponsible steps. An independent Ukraine does present a great danger for the whole Eurasia with its some territorial demands. It is meaningless to talk about continental geo-politics before the resolution of Ukrainian Question. However this does not mean that the Ukraine's cultural-literal-political autonomy should be constrained and should not be turned into a pure administrative part of centralized Russian state. But Ukraine has to strategically be the serious extension of Kremlin in the south and west. The total and in no way unlimited control of Moscow throughout whole border from Ukraine to Abkhazia is gazed at as the absolute necessity of Russian geo-politics in the Black Sea coasts. These regions radically have to be kept separately from Atlanticist influence that either comes from the West or Turkey and even Greece. The northern shores of Black Sea have to be the subject of uttermost Eurasianist and to Moscow in a centralized way.



Source: <https://globalriskadvisors.com/app/uploads/map-preview11.png?33fd1d>.

Although the geo-political components model of Ukraine is alike, the Ukrainian Question is more complicated. It is right to state that the geo-political greatness of Ukraine plays a very important role. When compared with many big European states, Ukraine is a colossal territorial composition. In this country, both the separatist and the political sovereignty tendencies are very active. Ukraine as a state does not have a geo-political meaning. It also does not have special cultural value, geographical uniqueness and ethnic originality. Its historical meaning comes from Rimland – Oukraina – the Border

<sup>12</sup> Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, pp. 175-176.

Lands.<sup>13</sup> In that sense, the independent presence of Ukraine especially within the context of modern borders comes into meaning as just “Buffer Cordon”. Because the controversial geo-political tendencies do not allow the complete unification of Kyiv with neither Eastern nor Western blocs; in other words neither Russia-Eurasia nor Central Europe. All of these issues do force Ukraine to geo-politically serve for its strategy in Europe via her naval force and it’s so called presence.<sup>14</sup> Within that framework, the role of Kyiv looks like the role of Baltic States. The presence of Ukraine together with its existing borders and sovereign state status does mean a terrible assault that can be seen as identical with the intervention to Russian lands as well as a harming issue for the geo-political security of Kremlin. Dugin underlines that it should not be allowed to sustain the unitary Ukraine any longer. This country has to be separated into several lines by pondering the geo-political and realities of ethno-cultural diversities.<sup>15</sup>

1. **Eastern Ukraine** (*All regions in the east of Dnieper from Chernigov to Azak Sea*): This is the region where mostly Velikiia (Veliko)-Russian and Orthodox Malorus population live. The whole region undoubtedly closes to Russia and it is culturally, historically, ethnically and religiously connected with Russia. This well-adopted and technically developed region can be an independent geo-political region with a wide autonomy and also an absolute and concrete alliance with Moscow.
2. **The Crimea** is a special geo-political composition generally known with its ethnic mosaic. Here the Velikorussians are pro-Moscow; on the contrary to this Malorussians are extreme nationalists.<sup>16</sup> Crimean Tatars are generally more pro-Turkey and anti-Russians. In generally, one cannot mention the taking into account of Crimean Tatars’ geo-political tendencies. Because in all senses, Turkey is counted as the geo-political adversary of Russian Federation. But the Tatar’s presence in Crimea should be considered. Direct unification of Crimea with Russia will primarily be reacted by Malorussian population and it will create problems in the integration of this peninsula into the Russian system through Ukrainian territories, though this is generally not realistic. It is not possible to leave the Crimea to the “Sovereign Ukraine” in that this will be a direct threat to Russia’s geo-political security and will cause ethnic tensions within Crimea. When all these evaluations are considered, a special status should be given to Crimea and also there emerges the necessity of giving a minimum autonomy that will include the taking into consideration the ethnic and cultural demands of Crimean Tatars as well as the socio-economic interests of Ukraine which will be under the direct strategic control of Kremlin.
3. **The Central Part of Ukraine including Kyiv and from Chernigov to Kyiv and ethnically dominated Malorussians and their language:** But the dominant factor in this region is the Orthodoxy. This Orthodox Malorussia is an independent geo-political reality that has culturally kinship with Eastern Ukraine and undoubtedly enters into the Eurasian geo-political system.
4. **The Western Ukraine is not identical.** This region is composed of Volin, Galiçya and Zakarpatye. They are different within the context of ethnic composition and political traditions. Autonomy in important levels (till reaching to political autonomy) should be presented to these destructive territories for their breaking up with Orthodox based pro-Russian central Ukraine and Eastern Ukrainian land. The strategic borders of Russia’s in

<sup>13</sup> Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, pp. 204-205, Cem Karadeli, “Ortaçağ’dan Günümüze Ukrayna’nın Kısa Tarihi”, in *Uluslararası Politikada Ukrayna Krizi*, eds. Hasret Çomak, Caner Sancaktar and Zafer Yıldırım, (İstanbul: Beta Yayınları, 2014), p.2 and Tolga Bilener, “Ulus-Devlet Olma Sürecinde Ukrayna”, in *Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna*, ed. Erhan Büyükkakıncı, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004), pp.311-314.

<sup>14</sup> İsmail Ermağan, “Rusya-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinde Ukrayna Çıkmazı”, in *Putin’in Ülkesi: Yeni Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Rusya Federasyonu Analizi – Siyasal Sistem, Ekonomi, Güvenlik ve Dış Politika*, ed. İrfan Kaya Ülger, (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2015), pp.688-689.

<sup>15</sup> Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, pp. 206-208.

<sup>16</sup> Yalçınkaya, “Bağımsız Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Dugin’in Yeni Avrasyacılık Önerileri”, pp.271-272.

these parallels cannot be dependent on the places where Ukraine-Poland, Ukraine-Hungary or Ukraine-Slovakia borders pass. This strategic line has to lie down farther West, at least to the western front of Central Europe and at best to the Atlantic. Because as the initiator of geo-political changes in the Eastern Europe and the foremost partner of Germany, Moscow has to be successful in the liberation of whole this region from Atlanticist control and instead has to insist on the foundation of Eurasianist continental defence system composed of military-strategic cooperation of Russia and Europe.

A cultural and sectarian border should be passed between Central Ukraine (Kyiv) and Western Ukraine in a way that the Orthodox lands can refrain from the influence of disordering Central Catholic Europe or UNIAT.<sup>17</sup> The Ukrainian Factor represents the weakest point in the western front of Russia. When the risk of spillover/fragmentation of geo-political richness of Heartland in other places is at the potential level and when the struggle for Eurasian geo-political system just puts preventive measures against it, the reality of sovereign Ukraine's presence is a geo-political declaration of war against Russia in the geo-political dimension (this is mostly related with Atlanticism and Sea Power rather than the Ukraine itself). In that manner, the issue is not Ukraine's consciously preference of being a buffer zone of Atlanticism – in reality this is not a conscious behaviour in some circumstances-. The issue is Kyiv's starting to play this role in practice by not actively involving in the integration processes with Moscow and not to be disintegrated into the separate geo-political components. The Ukrainian Problem is the notable and the most serious problem of Kremlin.<sup>18</sup> The Western geo-politics and the Ukrainian Question as the centre of this geo-politics necessitate Kremlin to take urgent preventive measures. Because a strategic beat to Russian Federation is likely to happen and it cannot be thought that the geographical axis of history does not respond to it. When the unlikelihood of Moscow's pure integration with Kyiv – even this happens against all objective preventions- and not bearing a concrete geo-political system, Moscow has to actively work on re-arranging the Ukraine Land according to a single rational geo-political model.




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<sup>17</sup> Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, pp. 209-210.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in Borderlands*, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2016), pp. 37-42.

Dugin highlights that the adoption of “*Decision on the Adoption of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine*”<sup>19</sup> by the State Duma of Russian Federation on December 25, 1998 represents a very important document for Moscow’s geo-political future.<sup>20</sup> On the one hand, this treaty proposes an alliance and strategic partnership relations which is a positive one. On the other hand, this legally records Moscow’s giving up territorial demands against Ukraine. If the strategic partnership of Russia and Ukraine is not resulted with the broader integrationist processes and if Ukraine does not turn out to be a part of Eurasianist continental structure in the future as well as stays a regional state, aforementioned treaty will be a document that Moscow leaves its fronts regarding a buffer state. Thus, given the objective factors and in case of an independent state, Ukraine has to grow into the base of NATO sooner or later in other words, the chief geo-political rival of Kremlin.<sup>21</sup>



Source: <http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/545a6f18eab8ead4588b456c-876-597/screen%20shot%202014-11-05%20at%201.39.28%20pm.png>.

Dugin stresses that Kyiv is the symbol of a nation-state, regional state; Moscow is the symbol of the empire and the harmony of Eurasianist Integrationism. Correspondingly, Kyiv is the past and the Moscow is the existing situation and the future.<sup>22</sup> Velikorussian Objective and Velikorussians meaning the real Russians’ main mission is to realize the Great Global Idea, Great Reality/Truth named as the Eurasian Sun Empire, God Empire. The Kyiv Objective is a very limited and more European, less universal and global which means that the Velikorussians’ objective is great and those Malorussians’ are small. To Dugin, it is difficult to find a pure blood in Russians. Malorussians, Velikorussians, Tatars, Uyghurs and

<sup>19</sup> Spencer Kimball, “Bound by treaty: Russia, Ukraine and Crimea”, *Deutsche Welle*, 11 March 2014, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/bound-by-treaty-russia-ukraine-and-crimea/a-17487632>, accessed 13 June 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, pp. 359-361.

<sup>21</sup> Andreas Umland, “Ukraine’s Understandable but Senseless Hope for NATO Membership”, *Atlantic Council*, 4 April 2016, available at: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ukraine-s-understandable-but-senseless-hope-for-nato-membership>, “Alexander Dugin: Letter to the American People on Ukraine”, *Open Revolt*, 8 March 2014, available at: <https://openrevolt.info/2014/03/08/alexander-dugin-letter-to-the-american-people-on-ukraine/>, accessed 21 July 2016.

<sup>22</sup> Alaeddin Yalçinkaya, “Sovyet Sonrası Rus Siyasetinde Avrasyacılık”, in *Putin’in Ülkesi: Yeni Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Rusya Federasyonu Analizi – Siyasal Sistem, Ekonomi, Güvenlik ve Dış Politika*, ed. İrfan Kaya Ülger, (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2015), p.86.



other Eurasian people have mixed up within the real Russians. Dugin is of the opinion that this is not a problem for Russian Federation as well as it is the guarantee of our uniqueness, universalness and greatness. Dostoyevsky did define the Russian people as “World-wide”. This morally belongs to the Velikorussian one. Because of this reason, a choice between Moscow and Kyiv is not an ethnic one. It is an objective choice and a geo-political homeland. Dugin underscores that this is a moral and religious choice rather than a racial choice. People rejecting the Eurasianist Project, emphasizing the narrow ethnic Velikorussian nationalism and defending just Russian regional state do behave like Ukrainians. Their national Russia will always be a “Malo (Small) Russia.” And also their national ideal will therefore become small and simple one sooner or later. The disintegration between Russian Federation and Ukraine is beneficial for Atlanticists which are the rivals of Russian Idealism.



Source: [https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/stratfor\\_full/public/main/images/Ukraine\\_crimea.jpg?itok=KR4xpJMC](https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/stratfor_full/public/main/images/Ukraine_crimea.jpg?itok=KR4xpJMC).

Dugin is certain of that the enemies of Eurasia and Atlanticist strategists want a confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv. One has to determine a tight priority meaning a joint Eurasian continental state, a unifier universal Moscovian objective between Moscow-Kyiv relations.<sup>23</sup> For him, in Ukraine, there exist potential and real supporters of this project. These include eleven-million pure Velikorussians, the majority of Orthodox Malorussians in which they are objective Soviet Eurasianists, all of them have socialist sensitivenesses. The most radical pro-independence groups and Ukrainian nationalists who are aware of the fact that the Atlanticist West will end up all national cultures, all national values have to become the supporters of “Eurasianist Union, New Empire, Enlightenment and Truth Empire.” Dugin does conclude that in order to defeat Atlanticist Evil, the only way is to unite.

## 2. Fundamental Parameters of American Eurasianism and Ukraine

*“Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geo-political pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.”*

Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, 1997, p.46.

<sup>23</sup> Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, p.364.

Eurasian region has a significant status in American foreign policy strategies. Especially, 9/11 terror attacks had substantially changed the strategies of Washington towards to Caucasasia and Middle Asia. Furthermore, the importance of Middle Asia has passed over Caucasasia because of Russian efforts to become more effective on the region.<sup>24</sup> According to Brzezinski, USA should constitute comprehensive, integrated and long term geo-strategies for entire Eurasia. This requirement arises from the interaction of two basic necessities: USA has been a super power and Eurasia has been a center of earth. Therefore, the actors that have been placing in the distribution of power in the Eurasian continent are going to become more precious for American global superiority and historical heritage.<sup>25</sup>



Source: [http://cdn.ruvr.ru/2014/12/25/1499230398/6Eurasia\\_and\\_eurasianism.jpg](http://cdn.ruvr.ru/2014/12/25/1499230398/6Eurasia_and_eurasianism.jpg).

The global superiority of the USA has been unique in terms of its qualifications. Zbigniew Brzezinski states that the U.S. has been a chief of Eurasian region.<sup>26</sup> Any significant conflict in Eurasia cannot be solved without the participation of Washington or its national interests. The main aim of America ought to be the consolidation of democratic system around that periphery. The most important geo-political reward for the U.S. is Eurasia. International relations had been controlled by Eurasian actors and people who fought with one another for regional authority and reached out for global power. Recently, non-Eurasian power is unrivalled in Eurasia and USA's global leadership is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its authority on the Eurasian region is continued.

The rapid emergence of the unique global power has created a situation in which an equally sudden end to its supremacy due to the US's withdrawal from world or due to the rapid emergence of a successful rival that would lead massive international instability.<sup>27</sup> Samuel Huntington, the late Harvard political

<sup>24</sup> İşyar, *Avrasya ve Avrasyacılık*, p. 62.

<sup>25</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 2012), p.123.

<sup>26</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 48-56.

<sup>27</sup> Martin A. Smith, *Power in the Changing Global Order*, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2013), p. 47.

scientist, has been claiming that a World without U.S. authority is going to be a World with much more violence, disorder and less democracy and financial improvement than a World where Washington continues to have more effect than any other country in shaping international relations.



Source: <https://cnngps.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/american-flag.jpg>.


One of the most critical issues that have to be pointed out is how America manages Eurasia.<sup>28</sup> Eurasia has been the largest continent and a power which control Eurasia would dominate two of the world's three most improved and economically productive lands. The authority upon Eurasia would almost pave the way for Africa's subordination. Eurasia region is hosting about %75 of world's society and most of the world's wealth is there as well. Eurasia has been placed most of the world's politically assertive and dynamic powers. The next greatest economies and the next six greatest spenders on military weaponry have been placed on that geography. Two most populous aspirants of the World to regional authority and global influence are Eurasian. Furthermore, the potential political and economic actors have been challenging the American hegemony in Eurasia.

Brzezinski stresses on that Washington has consistently expressed its willing to see Europe as a single integrity and sufficiently powerful to share with the White House's responsibilities and global leadership.<sup>29</sup> A long term American geo-strategy for Europe should address frankly the concern of European integrity and good affairs with Europe. There has been still a deep rooted improvement for a special Eurasian role. It would consequently pave the way the subordination to Moscow of the new emerged independent post-Soviet countries. It has to be considered that the U.S. primacy on the Eurasian region is going to be hit by turbulence and probably at least by occasional violence. The priority of Washington has been potentially indefensible to new challenges from regional opponents. America has determined its global system with threat of war which American primacy guided by a long term geo-strategy linked together by American dominated multilateral frameworks.

<sup>28</sup> Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, pp. 30-35.

<sup>29</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, *America and The World: Conversations on the Future of American Policy – Moderated By David Ignatius*, (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 199-201.





Source: <https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/brzezinski-grand-chessboard.jpg>.


According to Brzezinski, America must remain active in European security in order to guarantee the West's geopolitical relationship. Furthermore, it should encourage the deeper unification of the European Union and the strict cooperation among France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Central politics, economic and military alignment of Europe ought to continue and broaden. In addition, Russia could adopt an extensive law-based democratic transformation coherent with both EU and NATO standards, Turkey should join the European Union, putting both states on their way to join the transatlantic occurrence. However, increasing geo-political community of interest may arise among Washington. Since any tending to westward by Russia would likely be encouraged by closer relations between Ukraine and the EU. If the U.S.A does not support the rise of an enlarged West, dire results could be emerged. In particular, historical resentments could come back to life; short-sighted competitive partnerships could take shape. Moreover, Russia may have a chance to misuse its energy asset and incited by Western disunity and aspire to quickly absorb Ukraine, inspire its own imperial passions and contributing to greater international disorder.<sup>30</sup>

Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that Ukraine is more integral part of western civilization than Russia. The most important issue is which country has been more European. Ukrainian people have demonstrated a significant deal of ability to deal with diversity without recourse to arms. If Ukraine gets close to West and be a member of the EU and NATO, Russia is far more likely to follow suit than Ukraine does not.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, he states that Ukraine is not a member of NATO but it ought to be part of NATO but getting part of Europe is more desirable. Today, NATO and America have not been giving military aid to Ukraine. It has a right to be an independent state having friendly affairs with Europe but it is not necessary to become a NATO member. Moreover, if Ukraine is not only threatened but actually victimized by Russia using force, then some defensive arms and weaponry delivered to the Ukrainians makes reputable sense.

<sup>30</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Balancing the East, Upgrading the West: U.S Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 1, January/February 2012, pp. 97-104.

<sup>31</sup> Jonathan Power and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "War, Peace, and American Politics: Talking with Zbigniew Brzezinski," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2007, p. 77.





Source: <http://www.azquotes.com/picture-quotes/quote-russia-can-be-either-an-empire-or-a-democracy-but-it-cannot-be-both-without-ukraine-zbigniew-brzezinski-91-50-43.jpg>.

Brzezinski prescribes for extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward to Ukraine and lending strong support to the newly independent states in Central Asia and Caucasus, part and parcel of what might be termed a strategy of “tough love” for the Russians. He stresses on that America has an interest in leading the response to some disasters, insisting that public support is going to emerge. He thinks that humanitarian operations should be kept separate and distinct from State Department’s geopolitical perspective. It will compromise the humanitarian objectives that should be at the forefront of relief operations.<sup>32</sup>

Kom verder, Saxion.

## American foreign relations: Realpolitik

Zbigniew Brzezinski:  
*America is the only remaining superpower and remains necessary to solve Eurasian problems as independent referee → “Project for the new American century”*  
 The enemies of our enemies are our friends!

Source: <http://image.slidesharecdn.com/presentationfruytier-150327070250-conversion-gate01/95/presentation-about-ukraine-for-the-fruytterscholengemeenschap-32-638.jpg?cb=1427440315>.

<sup>32</sup> “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives by Zbigniew Brzezinski Reviewed by David C. Hendrickson “, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76 Issue 6, November/December, 1997 p. 160.

Ukraine has been a significant and fundamental space on the Eurasian chessboard and a geo-political pivot due to its existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian Empire. According to Brzezinski's Eurasian understanding, regarding the Russian aggression against Ukraine much depends on what Putin does next.<sup>33</sup> However what Putin does depends on not only his calculation of the likely NATO response but also his estimate of how fiercely the Ukrainian people would respond to any further escalation by Russia. The Ukrainian response would be influenced by citizens' reaction to any repetition of Putin's Crimean aggression and by whether the nation believes that the U.S. and NATO are truly supportive.

Intervention of Russian Federation in Ukraine is about giving announcement that Moscow is reluctant to approve Western dictation, fundamentally in its own neighbourhood, and that Russia considers itself being outside the West, as part of a non-Eurasian civilizational and geopolitical bloc.<sup>34</sup> The challenge for Washington is to simultaneously hinder Russia's imperial enthusiasm while protecting the door open for restored cooperation down the road. The White House is reluctant to be in war with Russia over Ukraine. However it ought to also do more to both make an aid to Ukraine in hold on Russian aggression and guarantee its European allies that its security engagements remain confute. The status of Ukraine as significant transit state and has a precious history and combative contract negotiations, price conflicts, failed payments and supply cut-offs has enhanced the strategic significance of energy in the geopolitical context. Energy has been an effective issue of the border geo-political subjects at the center of this current crisis.<sup>35</sup>

### 3. The Ongoing Ukraine Crisis

Subsequently the official downfall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, one of the states that gained its independence was Ukraine. In the post-independence era, Ukraine has been an arena of struggle between the Russian Federation and the Euro-Atlantic Bloc due to Kyiv's geo-political, geo-strategic, geo-economic and geo-cultural prominence.<sup>36</sup> Also in consequence of the fluctuations in the administrative staff of Ukraine several times since the independence, the country has been caught between Moscow and the West. In November 2013, the then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych did discard to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union and postponed the preparation committee working on this deal by presenting the national security as the focal reason. After that he did discuss and sign a deal including \$15 billion financial aid and discount on gas prices with Kremlin. The pro-Westerners have not recognized Yanukovych's this initiative and have planned demonstrations against him. Then, on account of several events, Yanukovych has required to step down from his post.<sup>37</sup> On top of this, the crisis has been spreading to other regions of Ukraine explicitly Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. In the meantime, the tensions between Kremlin and Washington-led Western Bloc have been escalating on account of the reciprocal restrictions and firm declarations.

<sup>33</sup> "Brzezinski on Russia: 'We Are Already in a Cold War' - An Interview by Sebastian Fischer and Holger Stark", *Spiegel Online International*, 2 July 2015, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-zbigniew-brzezinski-on-russia-and-ukraine-a-1041795.html>, accessed 26 July 2016.

<sup>34</sup> Daniel Treisman, "Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in Kremlin", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No.3, May/June 2016, p. 47.

<sup>35</sup> "Russia, Ukraine and European energy security - An interview with Natalia Slobodian, a National Centre for Strategic Studies energy expert living in Kyiv. Interviewer: Wojciech Jakóbiak", *New Eastern Europe*, 26 May 2016, available at: <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/2007-russia-ukraine-and-europe-s-energy-security>, accessed 26 July 2016.

<sup>36</sup> Sina Kısacık and Furkan Kaya, "An Assessment on The Future of Ongoing Turkish-Russian Relations: "Clash of Interests or Convergence of Interests", *International Multilingual Academic Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2016, pp.176-177.

<sup>37</sup> Nicholas Ross Smith, "The EU and Russia's conflicting regime preferences in Ukraine: assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of Ukraine crisis", *European Security*, 2015, p.11.



Source: <https://sperglord.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/new-geopolitical-map1.png>.

In that manner, one has to deliberate why the Crimea is so essential in the eyes of Russian Federation's Eurasianist understanding. The Moscow's concern to Crimea can be mapped out to its long motivation to reach the Black Sea region in the course of Catherina the Great Administration (1762-1796).<sup>38</sup> This has ended up with the 1774 Küçük Kaynarca Treaty. Then, Crimea did turn out to be the part of Tsarist Russia in 1783. For centuries, the Black Sea Region has constituted a very weighty geographical place for Moscow attributable to its representing the keystone to the Straits, Dardanelles and the Mediterranean. These facts have been closely affiliating with the Russian's centuries-long strategy of accessing to the warm seas.




Source: <http://eiri.bg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/blacksea.gif>.

The attaching of Sui generis significance by Kremlin to the naval power within the Vladimir Putin's terms has been growing into noticeable one included within a number of national security, foreign policy and military doctrines in recent times. Several strategic doctrines have been developed by Moscow within those years. Within this milieu, the Russian Naval Doctrine 2020 announced on July 27, 2001, has been among the top ones.<sup>39</sup> For this doctrine, Moscow has been continuing to be one of the most noteworthy naval powers thanks to its historical and geographical locations and her capability to reach the world's three oceans. The document focusing on unique status of country's naval power recommends numerous

<sup>38</sup> Neil Kent, *Crimea: A History*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), pp. 49-57.

<sup>39</sup> Matthew Bodner, "Black Sea Rising: Rebirth of a Russian Fleet", *The Moscow Times*, 17 March 2016, available at: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/black-sea-rising-rebirth-of-a-russian-fleet/562831.html>, accessed 21 June 2016.

measures which allow the enduring of Russian superiority and the movability of Russian naval fleets throughout the world. In this doctrine, the Sevastopol is defined as a vital military base in terms of Black Sea Fleet. According to a deal between Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych in 2010, the Russian Federation has secured the right to stay in Sevastopol till 2042.<sup>40</sup> On May 11, 2013, Alexander Fedotenkov, the deputy admiral of Black Sea Fleet, has stressed his country's will to continue stationing in Sevastopol in post-2042 period. In parallel with this, Kremlin has also possessed new bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 Russian-Georgian War for strengthening its hegemony in the Black Sea Region. For Turkey, the Russian positioning in the Mediterranean/Black Sea has converted a much more alarming issue when measured with Kremlin's policies toward launching naval fleets in Crimea and Georgia as well.<sup>41</sup> Russian Naval Doctrine 2020 has put forward a brand-new point of view through the emphasis on sea lines within the framework of transportation of Russian energy resources to outside markets. In that regard, the Nord Stream in Baltics, South Stream and Blue Stream in the Black Sea do visibly illustrate the practical applications of Russian naval doctrine.<sup>42</sup>



Source: <https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B9K1rh2IYAAP5g.png>.

In the aftermath of the 1991 August Coup and the disintegration of Republics, the USSR has thoroughly fallen and Crimea has come to be a self-governing republic within the Ukraine.<sup>43</sup> However the ethnic Russians living in the peninsula have instigated to build up undertakings toward the instant liberation of Crimea and then its re-integration with the Russia. In accordance with this, the nationalist forces in Moscow have professed their backings to the Russian community resided in Crimea. The permanent survival of ex-Soviet Union's foremost naval base in Sevastopol has renovated the Crimea's status into a chief confrontation subject between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.


<sup>40</sup> Par Philippe Conde and Vasco Martins, "Russia's Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol beyond 2017", 23 May 2010, available at: <http://www.diploweb.com/Russia-s-Black-Sea-fleet-in.html>, accessed 22 June 2016.

<sup>41</sup> Birke Boyat, "Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri", in *Türk Dış Politikasında Güncel Eğilimler (2000-2014)*, eds. Deniz Tansi and Hakan Sezgin Erkan, (İstanbul: Kanes Yayınları, 2015), pp. 222-223 and 228-230.

<sup>42</sup> Sina Kısacık, "Ukrayna: Rusya Federasyonu ve Avro-Atlantik Blok Arasında Sıkışan Bir Ülke", *Uluslararası Politika Akademisi*, 12 December 2013, available at: <http://politikaakademisi.org/2013/12/12/ukrayna-rusya-federasyonu-ve-avro-atlantik-blok-arasında-sıkışan-bir-ülke/>, accessed 23 June 2016.

<sup>43</sup> Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, *Novgorod Knezliği'nden XXI. Yüzyıla Rus İmparatorluk Stratejisi*, (Ankara: Atlas Kitap, 2015), pp. 411-412.





Source: [http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/01791/Crimea\\_profile\\_1791340a.jpg](http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/01791/Crimea_profile_1791340a.jpg),  
[http://ggc-mauldin-images.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/newsletters/Maritime\\_Choke\\_201625\\_TWIG.gif](http://ggc-mauldin-images.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/newsletters/Maritime_Choke_201625_TWIG.gif).

Kremlin's Crimea policies summarized as eventual belongingness of the peninsula to the Russian Federation can be given as the central reason wherein this attitude does explain the Moscow's strategy of backing up the ethnic Russian minority in the region and also the calculation of sensitive/vital subjects in the Crimea as a constituent of its internal matters.<sup>44</sup> The anti-government protests beginning at the end of November 2013 has been utterly overturned by means of violent protests in the direction of the 16 January laws. Russia as the biggest neighbor of Ukraine has been mute headed for these events in the first times appalling everybody. The \$50 billion-Sochi Winter Olympic Games did represent the main reason of this muteness. Because of the boycotts alongside this organization watched as a particular organization in terms of displaying new Kremlin, Putin had preferred to be mute in order not to damage this event.<sup>45</sup>

Conversely, subsequently the setting up of Ukraine's new government, Yatsenyuk's Prime Ministry and the termination of the Russian language as the official language with the cancellation of the Law on Minority Languages have triggered the stepping up of pro-Russian rallies in Crimea Autonomous Republic as a part of the Ukraine and have begun to be seen in the other cities of North Ukraine. In the aftermath of these riots, Moscow's military activities were seen.<sup>46</sup> First and foremost, Kremlin did bring up that these had been scheduled before the events in Ukraine; she did organize a four-day military exercise with the involvement of 150 thousand soldiers on February 28, 2014. According to the experts regarding this issue, Kremlin has put forward its willingness to empower its condition in this region through this military activity which includes all military branches. Within that context, this initiative of Kremlin should be assessed as Russian severe warnings toward Ukraine for not using force in Crimea. When considered from Moscow's perspective in line with the protection of Crimea's autonomous status and also the existence of 60 percent Russian population in Crimea, the following of a pro-active policy

<sup>44</sup> Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2015), pp. 81-86.

<sup>45</sup> "Putin's Olympics End under a Crimean Cloud", *The Moscow Times*, 17 March 2014, available at: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sochi2014/putin-s-olympics-end-under-a-crimean-cloud.html>, Mugambi Jouet, "The Sochi Olympics Emboldened Putin's Abuses in Ukraine and Russia", *The Huffington Post Blog*, 18 March 2014, available at: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mugambi-jouet/sochi-olympics-emboldened\\_b\\_4981517.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mugambi-jouet/sochi-olympics-emboldened_b_4981517.html), accessed 14 July 2016.

<sup>46</sup> Roy Allison, "Russian 'deniable' intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules", *International Affairs*, Vol. 90, No.6, 2014, pp. 1282-1289.

toward Crimea by Kremlin as well as direct/indirect military taking part of Kremlin in Crimea should be viewed as normal.<sup>47</sup> In order to better understand this phenomenon, the statements of Mikhail Margelov are mentioned for the West's revealing response to Kremlin's well-founded course of action with regard to Ukraine:

*"Since the beginning of the Ukraine Crisis, the West has failed to forsake the principle according to which only Western interests are legitimate. Nor has it learned the lesson of the events of August 2008, when Russia intervened in the war unleashed by the regime of Mikheil Saakashvili, in order to enforce peace in the region. The Georgian Crisis should have made clear to everyone that Russia is not only ready to make its voice heard, but is also prepared to use force when its national interests are at stake."*<sup>48</sup>



Source: <http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/49065652-aebf-11e3-a088-00144feab7de.img?width=595&height=532&title=&desc=>.

Pro-Russian groups made a plebiscite regarding the status of Crimea's status on March 16, 2014 wherein its end result was pre-arranged. The independence referendum refused by 99 percent of Crimean Turks has been resulted with the 97 percent of backing for the Crimea's re-integration with Russia.<sup>49</sup> This has been valued as null and void by quite a few Western governments together with United States<sup>50</sup>, Turkey<sup>51</sup> along with the EU.<sup>52</sup> But then afterward two days from the referendum, Putin has introduced on

<sup>47</sup> Nikolay Pakhomov, "Russian foreign policy in Ukraine: Fact vs. fiction", *Russia Direct*, 20 October 2014, available at: <http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/russian-foreign-policy-ukraine-fact-vs-fiction>, accessed 21 June 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Mikhail Margelov is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council. Please see: Mikhail Margelov, "Russia-West-East", *Valdai Discussion Club Opinion-Highlights*, 17 July 2014, available at: [http://valdaiclub.com/opinion/highlights/russia\\_west\\_east/?sphrase\\_id=3840](http://valdaiclub.com/opinion/highlights/russia_west_east/?sphrase_id=3840), accessed 3 June 2016.

<sup>49</sup> "Crimea declares independence, seeks UN recognition", *RT*, 17 March 2014, available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/crimea-referendum-results-official-250/>, accessed 21 June 2016.

<sup>50</sup> For United States of America's reaction please see, Richard Wolf, "Obama to Putin: U.S. will never recognize Crimea vote", *USA Today*, 16 March 2014, available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/16/russia-crimea-ukraine-referendum-sanctions/6493837/>, accessed 13 July 2016.

<sup>51</sup> For Turkey's reaction please see, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "No: 86, 17 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Referendum held in Crimea", 17 March 2014, available at: [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-86\\_-17-march-2014\\_-press-release-regarding-the-referendum-held-in-crimea.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-86_-17-march-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-referendum-held-in-crimea.en.mfa), accessed 12 July 2016.

<sup>52</sup> For European Union's reaction please see, Luke Harding and Shaun Walker, "Crimea votes to secede from Ukraine in 'illegal' poll", *The Guardian*, 16 March 2014, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/ukraine-russia-truce-crimea-referendum> and European Council

a signing of draft law foreseeing the takeover of Crimea and Sevastopol and the creation of federal regions in the well-known Ekaterininsky Saloon in the Kremlin Palace. On March 20-21, 2014, this decision would sequentially be ratified by State Duma and Russian Federation Council.<sup>53</sup> The Western world has been incapable of responding to this action and numerous ineffective sanctions have been announced by them toward the interests of Russian Federation.<sup>54</sup> Restraints to the travels of Russian currency and Russians, the prohibition of Moscow's participation from future G-8 meetings and the postponement of military and civilian relations with the Russian government are among the recommended sanctions. The ultimate precaution on the subject of this issue was embraced in the course of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs' meeting held on April 1, 2014, Brussels.<sup>55</sup> The Western governments' initiatives are most likely equivocal to force Kremlin to backward from its contemporary standpoint. To place it outspokenly, Moscow has amenable been effective in commanding her circumstances to its foes for the attainment of a victory in the Crimea.<sup>56</sup>



Source: <http://i2.wp.com/blogs.nvcc.edu/damiller/files/2014/03/latest3-23.png> ,  
[http://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/images/180316\\_crimea.jpg](http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/images/180316_crimea.jpg).

Russian President Vladimir Putin paid an official visit to Crimea for joining in remembrance ceremonies of the Soviets' victory against Nazis (Victory Day) on May 9, 2014.<sup>57</sup> Putin talking the re-integration of Crimea's with the Russian Federation as a historic actuality, has assumed that the year 2014 will come to pass in the history as the year that the local population decides on to re-unite with Russia and their corroboration of pledge to the historic authenticity.

Council of the European Union, "Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Crimea", 16 March 2015, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-declaration-high-representative-crimea/>, accessed 13 July 2016.

<sup>53</sup> Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine*, (New York: Basic Books, 2015), pp. 275-276.

<sup>54</sup> Kısacık and Kaya, "An Assessment on The Future of Ongoing Turkish-Russian Relations: "Clash of Interests or Convergence of Interests", p.187.

<sup>55</sup> Caşın and Derman, *Rus Dış Politikasındaki Değişim ve Kremlin Penceresinden Yeni Ufuklar*, pp.373-375 and also please see Mesut Hakkı Caşın, "NATO Stratejisindeki Değişim ve Rusya-NATO Rekabetinin Geleceği", in *Putin'in Ülkesi: Yeni Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Rusya Federasyonu Analizi – Siyasal Sistem, Ekonomi, Güvenlik ve Dış Politika*, ed. İrfan Kaya Ülger, (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2015), pp. 337-342.

<sup>56</sup> "Russian takeover of Crimea remains 'direct challenge to international security': Mogherini", *Ukraine Today*, 18 March 2016, available at: <http://uatoday.tv/news/rfe-rl-e-u-reiterates-it-does-not-recognize-russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-612709.html>, accessed 22 June 2016.

<sup>57</sup> "Ukraine crisis: Russia's Vladimir Putin visits Crimea as tensions mount in eastern Ukraine", *Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)*, 10 May 2014, available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-09/vladimir-putin-arrives-in-crimea/5443838>, accessed 29 June 2016.



HOME



### President Vladimir Putin:

"Considering the ethnic composition of the Crimean population, the violence there would have been worse [than in Kiev]. We had to act to prevent negative development, not to allow tragedies like the one that happened in Odessa: where dozens of people were burned alive"

Source: <https://syrianfreepress.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/putin-on-crimea-990x269-h.jpg?w=960&h=260&crop=1>.

On May 11, 2014, the pro-Russian groups in Donetsk and Lugansk organized a plebiscite for the successively establishment of Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics and these two republics' affirmation of independence from the Ukraine. In the aftermath of this referendum, the newly created People's Republic of Donetsk has acknowledged her amalgamation with the Russia.<sup>58</sup> On May 24, 2014, People's Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk did coalesce in a ceremony partaken by a number of Russian officials and has begun to name them as Novorossiia (New Russia). In response to this, EU, USA<sup>59</sup> and Turkey<sup>60</sup> have publicized that this announcement will not be recognized as valid due to the illegitimacy of plebiscite and Brussels has professed further sanctions headed for Moscow which will be valid till 23 June 2017.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Karina Oganessian, "Donetsk, Luhansk: The 'People's Republics' one year on", *Deutsche Welle*, 11 May 2015, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/donetsk-luhansk-the-peoples-republics-one-year-on/a-18444476>, accessed 21 June 2016.

<sup>59</sup> For international reactions toward the referendum in Eastern Ukraine please see, Simon Denyer and Anna Nemstova, "Eastern Ukrainians vote for self-rule in referendum opposed by West", *The Washington Post*, 11 May 2014, available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-rebels-say-they-are-seeking-a-mandate-not-independence-in-referendum/2014/05/11/ac02688a-d8dc-11e3-aae8-c2d44bd79778\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-rebels-say-they-are-seeking-a-mandate-not-independence-in-referendum/2014/05/11/ac02688a-d8dc-11e3-aae8-c2d44bd79778_story.html), and "Eastern Ukraine insurgents declare referendum victory, seek Russia annexation", *CBS News*, 12 May 2014, available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-walks-cautious-line-eastern-ukraine-referendums-donetsk-luhansk/>, accessed 13 July 2016.

<sup>60</sup> For Turkey's reaction please see, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "No: 148, 14 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Referendum Held in the Eastern Regions of Ukraine", 14 May 2014, available at: [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-148\\_-14-may-2014\\_-press-release-regarding-the-referendum-held-in-the-eastern-regions-of-ukraine.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-148_-14-may-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-referendum-held-in-the-eastern-regions-of-ukraine.en.mfa), accessed 12 July 2016.

<sup>61</sup> "EU 'to extend sanctions' against Russia over Ukraine conflict", *France 24*, 21 June 2016, available at: <http://www.france24.com/en/20160621-eu-extend-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-conflict> and European Council - Council of the European Union, "Illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol: EU extends sanctions by one year", Press release 341/16 Foreign affairs & international relations, 17 June 2016, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/17-annexation-crimea-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions/>, accessed 18 July 2016.





Source: <https://i.ytimg.com/vi/kGDok0Ga5ac/hqdefault.jpg>, <https://curiousmatic.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NewRussiaMap-1.jpg>.

## Conclusion



Source: <http://www.freakingnews.com/pictures/115500/Obama-and-Putin-s-International-Chess-Match-115652.jpg>.

Since the beginning of world history, the Eurasian geography has been representing a vital importance given its inclusion of strategic trade routes, the possession of rich mineral resources as well as the existence of great civilizations. Not only the regional powers but also the global powers have been aware of this significance and they have been presenting very comprehensive policies in order for being effective in this region. The Russian Federation and United States of America as the two most powerful and leading states in the world politics cannot be considered independently from this phenomenon.

Since the Tsarist Era, controlling and being the dominant power within the context of Eurasia region has been the most indispensable issue in Russian strategic thinking. In order to realize this goal, Russian officials have been developing voluminous strategies which include soft power and hard power means. From the end of WWII to the end of Cold War, the most of the Eastern Eurasia was being under the hegemony of Soviet Union. In the post-downfall of USSR, this area has redeemed its critical prominence for the whole world because of its noticeable place in the geo-political, geo-strategical, geo-economic and geo-cultural considerations of the world politics. In the first ten years of newly-founded Russian Federation, Moscow would have to deal with the very serious problems of disintegration. As a result of this situation, she has not attached the necessary attention toward Eurasia. However, in the Boris Yeltsin's presidency term, the Near Abroad Doctrine was declared in April 1993, lining up the Commonwealth of

Independent States and accentuating the metamorphosis between the Western and Russian interests in the new world order. This doctrine has been putative as the distinctively most key evidence of the growing pragmatist nationalist line with reference to the foreign policy, holding three principal pillars that are *Security Factor* defined as the anxiety of scattering of the constant clashes into the Russia, *Economic Factor* meant to be the permanency of economic bonds with the regional countries and lastly the *Cultural Factor* that is to say the safeguarding of the rights of 25 million Russian diaspora existing in this region. In parallel with this document, the Eurasianist approach instructed by Aleksandr Dugin foreseeing the restoration of sphere of influence in Near Abroad by the Russian Federation has grown into increasingly popular in Kremlin. This foreign policy line has been continuing to be Moscow's chief foreign policy preference exclusively after the coming into the power of Vladimir Putin in 2000. In that term, Moscow has greatly benefited from the international atmosphere and has mended itself especially with the economic context thanks to high oil prices. Thus, it has begun to reclaim its old power and turn out to be one of the most significant powers within the framework of Eurasian geo-politics. Since that time, it has been proactively involving into the matters vis-à-vis this geography.

In the Near Abroad and Eurasianist Doctrine of Dugin, one of the countries that have been emphasized as vitally significant does represent Ukraine. Both of these two doctrines have one thing in common on the issue of Ukraine that is; Ukraine is geo-politically, geo-strategically, geo-economically and geo-culturally crucial country which has to be permanently under the control of Moscow and its orientations to the Euro-Atlantic Community have to be prevented through the use of both soft and hard power tools by Kremlin. In that manner, it can noticeably be comprehended from this assumption that the Russian Federation has totally been opposing Kyiv's initiatives to turn out to be one of the members of NATO and European Union. The contemporary policies and strategies followed by Kremlin toward the ongoing Ukraine Crisis, starting in November 2013 can best be apprehended from these viewpoints. For American perspective, Ukraine has to be kept under control of Euro-Atlantic Bloc in order to contain Moscow's initiatives over the Eurasian mainland. We do conclude that by moving from these assumptions, it can be revealed that the power struggle between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine will likely to withstand in the near and longer terms as long as this country does preserve its geopolitical worth.

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