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<article-title>Stickiness of Local Government Transfer<br/> Revenues in Slovenia</article-title>
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<author>Primo&#382; Pevcin </author>

<aff>University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. </aff>

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<title>ABSTRACT</title>
<p> The problem of unequal response of local government expenditures on equal increase in local community income and lump-sum transfers has been observed in many empirical studies on cross-sectional variation in intergovernmental transfers to different local governments. This notion has been termed as the fly-paper theory of incidence, as money should stick where it hits. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that the fly-paper effect could not be validated for intergovernmental transfer revenues of Slovenian municipalities. Potential explanation could be derived from the agenda control model of the fly-paper theory. </p><p><italic>Keywords: </italic>Fly-paper theory of incidence, Local authorities, Municipal transfer revenues.  </p>
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<hpdf>VIE264</hpdf>
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