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<article-title>Us Intervention in Iran:  The Overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh, A Cold War Casualty
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<author>Michael R. Hall
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<aff> Armstrong Atlantic State University, USA</aff>


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<title>ABSTRACT</title>
<p> On 19 August 1953, after three days of rioting and internal disturbances, opposition forces encouraged and supported by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) overthrew democratically-elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.  US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, did not acknowledge publically the role played by the CIA.  Nevertheless, US involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh was indicative of US policy during the early years of the Cold War.  In the four decades following this covert action, most US interventions (both covert and overt) were motivated primarily by the perceived fear of US policy makers that a foreign government was taking itself out of the US-dominated Western sphere of influence and placing itself in the Soviet-dominated Eastern sphere of influence.  Covert CIA activities were only successful where there was a sufficient degree of internal pressure against the national government, as was the case in Iran in 1953.<sup>1</sup>  Although the Eisenhower administration did not acknowledge publicly the role played by the CIA in 1953, today there is no longer any doubt that the CIA was involved.<sup>2</sup>    
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<p><italic>Keywords:</italic> Central intelligence agency, Iran, Mohammad mossadegh, Oil industry, US-Iranian foreign relations.</p>
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